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I. INTRODUCTION
The greatest foe of good tax reforms is the ambition to establish a
perfect tax reform.
This article proposes to reform the current income tax
conventions that currently tax income generated from financial
holdings and transactions (“financial income”) in the growing global
finance industry.
In promoting its proposal, the article advances both a descriptive
argument and a normative one. The first, descriptive, argument traces
the development of sourcing conceptions in the international income
tax regime (IITR). It identifies policymakers’ growing readiness in
recent years to reformulate the obsolete conventions according to
which the financial income of multinational enterprises (MNEs) is
allocated between sovereigns. The article claims that some of these
reformulations, although still in their preliminary stages, may mark
the beginning of a new Allocation Phase era in the IITR. In this era,
the need to prevent abuse by MNEs may drive policymakers to
consider abandoning current formalistic sourcing conventions.
Instead, they may seek more administratively sound tax sourcing rules
for financial transactions of MNEs that better adhere to the economic
reality of the evolving global corporate business structure.
The article’s second, normative, argument is that the main
challenge for the IITR is to adequately source affiliated transactions
occurring within integrated MNE business structures. The article
focuses on financial transactions that take place in the integrated
global financial market. This integrated setting makes it difficult for

BENSHALOM.FORMATTED.FINALEDIT5.DOC

2008]

Tax Financial Income in a Global Economy

11/18/2008 4:25 PM

167

tax authorities to rely on old sourcing conventions, which require
using the arm’s-length standard and reporting transactions among
affiliates as if they were priced and structured by unrelated parties.
This idea of arm’s-length reporting is deficient where it is difficult to
price the transactions or to validate their structure. This article focuses
on the validation-of-structure problem, stressing that, in the case of
finance, tax law has not come anywhere close to determining the
“proper” structure of financial transactions. Tax law relies on legal
formalism to categorize financial transactions, an approach that allows
taxpayers considerable flexibility in controlling the tax consequences
of these transactions. Thus, tax authorities’ attempts to prevent abuse
by scrutinizing affiliated financial transactions through arm’s-length
lenses cannot promote any policy objective of equitable or efficient
taxation. This article contributes an innovative and comprehensive
answer to this problem, arguing that, at least in the case of MNEs that
are financial intermediaries (FMNEs) and earn primarily financial
income, income should not be sourced through transactional arm’slength methods. Instead, the article suggests that FMNE financial
income should be computed as a whole and then allocated to the
different jurisdictions where it operates according to a formula. The
formula it proposes relies on hard-to-manipulate factors that indicate
the geographic location where FMNE financial income has been
generated. These measures net the financial income of an FMNE and
allocate it among the different jurisdictions in which it operates. The
allocation should be done according to a formula employing immobile
and difficult-to-manipulate indicators that track the volume of an
FMNE’s activities in each jurisdiction in which it operates.
Part II of the article puts the issue in context by presenting the
basic structure of the IITR and the difficulties tax authorities face
when seeking to tax financial income. This part then identifies the
four key problems with the taxation of financial income: income
shifting, deferral, excessive credit repatriation, and evasion. Part III
develops the descriptive claim of the article. Following up on previous
1
research, the article demonstrates policymakers’ growing readiness to
admit the limitations of the arm’s-length approach and to consider
new formulary allocation methods of sourcing MNEs’ financial
income. The article substantiates this claim by examining recent
developments in a number of thin-capitalization regimes and
Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

1

Ilan Benshalom, The Quest to Tax Interest Income: Stages in the Development
of International Taxation, 27 VA. TAX REV. 631 (2008).
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branch allocation guidelines. Part IV offers a proposal for sourcing
financial income through formulary methods. To elucidate the
principles of its proposal, this part assumes an “ideal” reality in which
all MNE income is financial income, there is a multilateral agreement,
and the boundaries of MNEs are not in dispute. Part V presents the
article’s conclusions.
II. THE ISSUE IN CONTEXT
A. The Basic Setting of the IITR
The IITR comprises two different types of income taxes: those
imposed by the source jurisdiction (where income is formed through
the productive activity of tangible and intangible assets, human
capital, and capital investments) and those imposed by the residence
2
jurisdiction (where the individual or corporate investor resides).
Formally, source jurisdictions have the right to first levy taxes on any
type of income. However, in the case of income derived from financial
assets, the taxing rights of source jurisdictions are often severely
3
eroded in favor of those of residence jurisdictions.
There are two relevant types of source taxes on foreign corporate
4
investments: the corporate income tax and withholding taxes.
Corporate tax is laid on the net taxable income of a corporate entity.
If the corporation derives income from domestic and foreign sources,
the corporate tax is applied as a source tax (on the income raised by
domestic operations) and as a residency tax (on income generated
abroad). In contrast, withholding taxes are laid on different types of
payments (e.g., dividends, royalties, and interest) made by domestic
taxpayers to foreign investors and trading partners; that is,

2

A residence country’s entitlement to tax the income of one of its residents is
generally secondary to the source country’s right to tax that same income. If the
residence jurisdiction levies a tax, it customarily offers some type of relief for taxes
paid in the source jurisdiction. See Julie Roin, Rethinking Tax Treaties in a Strategic
World with Disparate Tax Systems, 81 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1760–81 (1995) (providing a
good summary of the United States’s foreign tax-credit system); Stephen E. Shay et
al., “What’s Source Got to Do with It?” Source Rules and U.S. International Taxation,
56 TAX L. REV. 81, 83 (2002).
3
See generally Roin, supra note 2, at 1760–62 (summarizing the main arguments
in favor of source and residence taxation).
4
Although much of this article’s discussion is relevant outside the corporate
framework, this article limits its analysis to corporations, since international
commerce is overwhelmingly conducted by them. Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax
Discrimination Against International Commerce, 54 TAX L. REV. 131, 131 (2001).
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withholding taxes are laid on sources of gross income and not upon
net taxable income. Federal statutory law in the United States
prescribes that every interest payment made to nonresidents that is
not effectively connected with a trade or business in the United States
is subject to a statutory withholding tax rate of 30% unless it qualifies
5
for an exception.

5

I.R.C. §§ 861(a), 862(a)(1), 871(a), 881(a)(1).
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FIGURE 1. A TAXONOMY OF THE IITR TAXES
Country A

6

Country C

(source and residence
jurisdiction)
Headquarters:
$(+150)
net income

$20

Unrelated
party:
$(-100)
net income

Interest/royalty (gross
income payments) subject to
withholding taxes*

Foreign
branch:
$(+100)
net
income

$50

Country B
(source jurisdiction)

Payments to unrelated party in C** subject to
source withholding taxes:
Country A:
$20 subject to A’s withholding
taxes.
Country B:
$50 subject to B’s withholding
taxes.

Net income subject to corporate tax:
Country A:
$250 worldwide/residence
income subject comprised
of two components (each
subject to corporate tax).
$150 on domesticallysourced income subject to
corporate tax as a source
tax.
$100 foreign sourced
income of the branch
subject to A’s corporate
tax as a residence tax.
Country B:
$100 source income
subject to source
corporate tax.

A corporation is a tax resident of country A. It has its headquarters located in country A and a foreign
branch in country B. In a given year, the corporation earned $150 from its business activities in country A
and $100 from its business activities in country B. (Both figures represent net taxable income before taxes.)
In this example, country B is solely a source jurisdiction; therefore, it lays its corporate tax as a source tax
on the $100 earned by the corporation in it. Country A is both a source and a residence jurisdiction.
Therefore, it lays its corporate tax on the entire $250 earned by the corporation in that year. Country A’s
corporate tax is laid as a source tax on the $150 earned by the corporation in its jurisdiction and as a
residence tax on the foreign sourced income earned by the corporation’s foreign branch in country B. To
avoid double taxation, country A, the residence jurisdiction, will typically grant the corporation tax credits
for the corporate income taxes it pays abroad in the source jurisdiction, country B. All corporate income
taxes are laid on net taxable income (before taxes), so if the corporation were losing money, it would not be
exposed to the taxes. Withholding taxes are laid by the source country on gross income payments. In the
above example, assume that the corporation’s headquarters (located in country A) took out a loan from an
unrelated lender in country C and the foreign branch (in country B) leased some intellectual property rights
from it. In a given year, the corporation's headquarters and foreign branch had to pay $20 interest and $50
royalty payments, respectively, to the unrelated party. In this case, countries A and B could lay withholding
taxes on those payments. These taxes, which are nominally imposed on the unrelated party, are not income
taxes, since they would have to be paid even if the party incurs losses in a given year and therefore has no
economic income.
* Withholding taxes may also be laid on dividend payments as well as interest and royalty payments
made from a foreign subsidiary to its parent.
** The withholding taxes are levied on gross income payments, and thus are imposed even though the
unrelated party in country C has a net income loss in the taxable year in which it is receiving the
payments.

B. The Difficult Terrain of Taxing Financial Income
The attempt by tax authorities to tax income derived from
modern financial activities comprehensively and equitably is a
Herculean task. The article refers to this income as “financial
income.” (Part V.A., infra, presents a more detailed analysis about the
6

39.

This figure and example were both used in Benshalom, supra note 1, at 638–
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precise definition of this term). The accelerating velocity of changes in
financial markets imposes a heavy burden on legislators and tax
authorities trying to formulate effective rules and enforcement
policies. These changes can be separated crudely into a number of
interwoven layers. First, the post-industrial economy is becoming a
more service-laden one in which the overall value and volume of
7
informational assets is constantly increasing. The value of these assets
(e.g., intangibles and financial assets), which do not have any tangible
location, mainly comprises the human capital resources invested in
their formation and deployment. The difficulty of valuing information
assets and the growing mobility of these assets make it difficult for tax
8
authorities to place and value significant sources of income.
Second, technological advancements, particularly in the fields of
computers and telecommunication, have been constantly changing the
platforms on which financial commercial activity takes place. This
“change in platforms” bundles together a number of different aspects.
Finance activities are taking place today in international markets (a
trend that started most notably with the development of the
9
Eurobond markets ), which are much more loosely regulated than
traditional domestic ones. These markets offer their investors a wide
range of volatile, readily tradable portfolio investment alternatives,
which deviate considerably from traditional foreign direct investment
10
practices. Modern markets operate in electronic venues and are
monitored by investors and issuers that reside in developed countries.
Communication technologies also allowed financial intermediaries to
expand and to offer a wider range of end services in numerous
11
jurisdictions. Computer technologies even created new types of
7

David R. Hardy, Assignment of Corporate Opportunities — The Migration of
Intangibles, 100 TAX NOTES 527, 527 (July 28, 2003).
8
See Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles,
Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261, 317 (2001);
Hardy, supra note 7.
9
James P. Holden, Jr., Note and Comment, Repeal of the Withholding Tax on
Portfolio Debt Interest Paid to Foreigners: Tax and Fiscal Policies in the Context of
Eurobond Financing, 5 VA. TAX REV. 375, 383 (1985) (describing the development
and attributes of Eurobond markets and the manner by which they insure investors’
anonymity and withholding free returns).
10
For instance, an American issuer on the Eurobond market will typically avoid
the regulatory constraints of making a public offering. The issuer will know very little
about the identity of the bond purchasers. In the case of financial institutions
operating from offshore financial centers, the Eurobond markets offer a platform in
which they can operate with little or no reserve requirements.
11
See generally Peter Athanas, Permanent Establishments of Banks, Insurance
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electronic currencies. In light of these technology-driven changes,
financial transactions occur quickly and without leaving a paper trail.
This renders tax (and regulatory) monitoring of financial activities
difficult.
Third, the use of innovative financial derivative instruments grew
significantly in the last quarter of a century — a development, which
was catalyzed by the increasing sophistication of international
13
financial markets. These finance instruments are often engineered
contractually to provide taxpayers with timing and character tax
arbitrages. Timing arbitrage reflects a taxpayer’s ability to defer or
accelerate income or deductions. Character tax arbitrage is a
taxpayer’s ability to translate any type of highly-taxed investment into
a different, yet economically near-equivalent investment instrument
14
(or array of instruments), effectively subject to a lower tax rate.
Taxpayers are therefore able to manipulate the classification of a
certain profit or loss on the instrument and its proceeds as either
15
capital gains or ordinary income.
Fourth, another important shift is the migration of financial assets
16
and activities to offshore financial tax havens. The unregulated and

Companies and Other Financial Institutions, 81 CAHIERS DE DROIT FISCAL
INTERNATIONAL 1, 71 (1996) [hereinafter IFA].
12
Vito Tanzi, Globalization, Technological Developments, and the Work of
Fiscal Termites, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1261, 1267–68 (2001).
13
Financial derivatives sometimes include indices that represent a composite
price mechanism rather than a specific type of asset. Accordingly, derivatives allow
cash commutation of the values of capital, commodities, and intangibles without an
actual exchange taking place in the ownership of the underlying assets. See TIM
EDGAR, THE INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS: THEORY AND
PRACTICE (2000).
14
Character arbitrage into two different types: first, the ability to characterize
net gains or losses as ordinary income, short capital gains, and long capital gains; and
second, the ability to characterize financial instruments as equity or debt (in the latter
case, making payments deductible).
15
See Jeffrey M. Colón, Financial Products and Source Basis Taxation: U.S.
International Tax Policy at the Crossroads, U. ILL. L. REV. 775, 778 (1999); Edgar,
supra note 13 (providing a comprehensive account of the law and economics of
various financial instruments and explaining the role of hybrids and synthetic
instruments as well as the difficulty of taxing them under existing cubbyhole tax
conventions); Robert H. Scarborough, How Derivatives Use Affects Double Taxation
of Corporate Income, 55 TAX L. REV. 465 (2002) (demonstrating how financial
innovations could be used to avoid corporate tax while providing quasi-equity
interests to their holders); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Financial Contract Innovation and
Income Tax Policy, 107 HARV. L. REV. 460 (1993).
16
Tanzi, supra note 12, at 1271–72, 1279.
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untaxed offshore financial sector has developed gradually in the
shadows of emerging global financial markets, with the implicit
17
consent of developed countries. The lack of regulatory and tax costs
in tax havens allows investors to pool and utilize their capital
18
resources efficiently. Additionally, such tax havens offer taxpayers
fertile grounds for tax planning, avoidance, and deferral
19
opportunities. More importantly, they provide individuals and
20
businesses with significant evasion opportunities. These evasion
opportunities are a byproduct of low tax rates and bank and corporate
secrecy laws in tax havens. The widespread use of the Internet plays
an important role in the offshore industry. The Internet protects
21
evading taxpayers’ anonymity, eases their communication with
offshore promoters, and allows them to transfer funds and control
investment vehicles (e.g., trusts, accounts, and corporations) in tax
havens. Taxpayers often fail to report their income from investments
in those jurisdictions, and tax authorities do not devote the necessary
22
resources to obtain information about evaders or to prosecute them.
Consequently, offshore financial tax havens flourish by attracting
23
capital flights from high-tax countries. This results in significant
revenue losses, major inefficiencies of investment allocation, and a
24
shield for illicit money laundering activities.
Fifth, there has been a salient shift in the business culture with
17

See generally SOL PICCIOTTO, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TAXATION 117

(1992).
18

Yesim Yilmaz, Tax Havens, Tax Competition, and Economic Performance, 43
TAX NOTES INT’L 587, 592 (Aug. 14, 2006).
19
See generally id. at 590.
20
See Douglas J. Workman, The Use of Offshore Tax Havens for the Purpose of
Criminally Evading Income Taxes, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 675, 681–86 (1982);
Cono R. Namorato & Scott D. Michel, International Criminal Tax Cases, 50 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 617, 621 (1996) (explaining how phony deductible business expenses to
foreign corporations could be used to transfer money to accounts at offshore financial
centers); Thomas W. Ostrander, The Offshore Credit Card and Financial Arrangement
Probe: Fraught with Danger for Taxpayers, 99 J. TAX’N 113, 113–15 (2003) (explaining
how evaders cash out hidden offshore financial assets through electronic payment
devices and exploring the Service’s attempts to trace such payments).
21
See Arthur J. Cockfield, Designing Tax Policy for the Digital Biosphere: How
the Internet Is Changing Tax Laws, 34 CONN. L. REV. 333, 343–45 (2002).
22
See Pamela H. Bucy, Criminal Tax Fraud: The Downfall of Murderers,
Madams and Thieves, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 639, 640 (1997).
23
See Robert T. Kudrle & Lorraine Eden, The Campaign Against Tax Havens:
Will It Last? Will It Work?, 9 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 37, 40–41 (2003) (providing a
brilliant taxonomy of tax havens).
24
Id. at 41–42, 44–45.
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regard to tax planning. This trend began in the 1970s when United
States corporations formed foreign subsidiaries to overcome tax and
regulatory access barriers to the Eurobonds markets. This practice,
along with early tax legislation of the Reagan Administration that
encouraged tax planning, induced an ever-growing hunger in the
25
corporate sector for tax arbitrage profits during the early 1980s. This
desire for easy tax profitability escalated as the liberalization and
competitiveness of the global economy increased. Recently, the tax
planning industry developed a number of aggressive, yet effective, tax
planning techniques that exploit the “check the box” regulations and
the use of hybrid entities. These techniques allow MNEs to repatriate
excessive foreign tax credits and avoid taxation of holding companies
26
in low-tax jurisdictions under Subpart F.
Sixth, the arm’s-length standard is a transaction-based convention
27
applied to source transactions between affiliated parties. Through a
set of transfer-pricing rules, it inquires how hypothetical unrelated
28
parties would price a certain transaction, requiring each corporate
29
entity within an MNE group to report accordingly. In the related
party finance realm, it is virtually impossible for tax authorities to
unveil and systemize MNEs’ financial structures according to the
arm’s-length standard. Pricing the “proper” interest rate of a specific
related debt transaction is a feasible task for the tax authorities of
developed countries. However, tax authorities have no conceptual
benchmark for determining whether the debt form of the transaction

25

Michael J. Graetz, Your Tax Dollars at Work: Why U.S. Tax Law Needs to Be
Changed, 48 EMORY L.J. 849, 857 (1999).
26
Lawrence Lokken, Territorial Taxation: Why Some U.S. Multinationals May
Be Less Than Enthusiastic About the Idea (and Some Ideas They Really Dislike), 59
SMU L. REV. 751, 759–63 (2006) (showing how MNEs use hybrid entities for
importing tax credits); Yilmaz, supra note 18, at 590 (claiming that holding hybrid
entities in tax havens are used by United States MNEs to reduce foreign subsidiaries
tax liabilities while avoiding exposure to Subpart F liabilities).
27
See Roin, supra note 2, at 1787 (suggesting that the United States may be
losing significant revenues because of related party transactions).
28
David H. Rosenbloom, Banes of an Income Tax: Legal Fictions, Elections,
Hypothetical Determinations, Related Party Debt, 26 SYDNEY L. REV. 17, 27 (2004)
(arguing that hypothetical tests are needed in the income tax because contractual
fictions allow for many situations in which transactions cannot be accepted at face
value).
29
Robert A. Green, The Future of Source-Based Taxation of the Income of
Multinational Enterprises, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 18, 45–47 (1993); Joann M. Weiner,
U.S. Treasury Office of Tax Analysis Paper Considers States’ Experience Regarding
Formula Apportionment, 1999 WTD 182-23 (Sept. 21, 1999).
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is proper, given the numerous alternatives available to taxpayers for
mobilizing and repackaging fungible capital assets. MNEs’ flexibility
in arranging their capital structure allows them to locate their capital
assets (and derivative income proceeds) in low-tax jurisdictions and
their finance expenses in high-tax jurisdictions. The arm’s-length
standard cannot source coherently affiliated financial transactions
because there is no one “correct” and objective standard for allocating
30
financial risks. Capital’s tax-sensitivity, mobility, and homogeneous
31
nature make it possible and profitable for taxpayers to manipulate
their earnings — a reality that tax authorities find difficult to confront
32
given their limited audit and litigation resources.
Another source of difficulty is the gradual erosion of withholding
taxes over the course of the last fifty years. There have been two main
sources of this erosion. The first source is the gradual reciprocal
reduction of withholding taxes through double taxation treaties
(DTTs). Countries entering into DTTs tend to reduce their statutory
withholding tax rates, because withholding tax rates on gross income
are considered an impediment to foreign investments and trade
relations. The impact of these DTTs is intensified through a practice
known as treaty shopping. Treaty shopping occurs when
(sophisticated) taxpayers channel financial flows through conduit
entities in jurisdictions with favorable DTT-networks to avoid
unfavorable withholding taxes levied upon payments to
33
nonresidents. This way, taxpayers are able to extend withholding tax
reductions, attained through such “DTT-havens,” to entities in
jurisdictions with more conservative DTT policies. In response to
these abuses of the DTT-network, it has become common practice for
some nations, most notably the United States, to enter limitation of
30

Gary D. Sprague, Application of Transfer Pricing Rules to Branches and
Permanent Establishments — Electronic Commerce and Intangible Property Aspects,
10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 971, 988 (2002).
31
See Daniel N. Shaviro, Does More Sophisticated Mean Better? A Critique of
Alternative Approaches to Sourcing the Interest Expense of U.S. Multinationals, 54
TAX L. REV. 353, 393–95 (2001).
32
An illustration of this issue is the difficulty of allocating profits to foreign
branches of banks. See IFA, supra note 11, at 72; Peter Randall, Attribution of Profits
to Permanent Establishments of Financial Institutions, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 875
(2002).
33
These practices are facilitated mainly through developed countries with
extensive DTT-networks (e.g., the United Kingdom and the Netherlands). MNEs and
other international equity and debt investors may create conduit entities in such
“DTT-havens” to transfer funds through them. See Charles I. Kingson, The
Coherence of International Taxation, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1151, 1275 (1981).
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benefits clauses into their DTTs and to enact anti-conduit statutory
35
legislation.
Doubt, however, has arisen over the effective
36
enforcement of these arrangements. The second source of
withholding tax erosion is source countries’ withholding tax
exemptions on income derived from elastic and tax-sensitive capital
37
investments (e.g., portfolio investments and bank accounts). Source
countries typically grant these exemptions as broad unilateral
measures. The high demand for foreign investments dictates that,
lacking any cartelized multilateral coordination, these types of mobile
investments are subject to extensive tax competition. International
investors often use the high demand for their investments to shift
withholding tax burdens to debtors in source countries — rendering it
difficult politically to sustain these taxes.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the above-mentioned
attributes, along with the financial and monetary liberalization in the
post-Cold War globalization era, have enhanced tax competition over
now-elastic capital resources and financial activities. Subject to
38
inferior information and to prisoner’s dilemma constraints, loosely-

34

See, e.g., United States Model Income Tax Convention art. 22, Sept. 20, 1996;
JOSEPH ISENBERGH, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 245–46 (2000); David R. Tillinghast,
Tax Treaty Issues, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 455, 465–66 (1996) (mentioning that having a
limitation of benefits provision has become an inflexible demand of the United States
in DTT negotiations).
35
I.R.C. § 7701(l); Treas. Reg. § 1.881-3 (1998) (combating back-to-back loans).
36
This doubt results from the high negotiation costs, complexity, and enormous
information-finding and litigation costs that tax authorites are not able to cover.
37
Michael J. Graetz & Itai Grinberg, Taxing International Portfolio Income, 56
TAX L. REV. 537, 547–54 (2003) (providing the key distinctions between direct and
portfolio investments and arguing that the latter is more short term and volatile, thus
responding with greater mobility to bottom-line changes in expected returns and to
changes in the financial markets).
38
The following table shows the tax competition grid. Assume a world with only
two countries, A and B, which share materially equivalent investment attributes for
mobile capital assets. Each country wants to attract investments and levy income
taxes on its proceeds. The prisoner’s dilemma table includes two parameters, amounts
of investments and of revenue:
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coordinated governments are motivated to try to attract investments
39
from international taxpayers (such as MNEs). MNEs’ ability to
pressure governments for tax concessions makes it difficult to identify
whether the source of the effective reduction in their tax liabilities is a
result of aggressive planning or of deliberate governmental attempts
40
to compete for their activities by reducing their effective tax rates.
MNEs’ perceived responsiveness to skew their financial activities
41
according to tax incentives
encourages governments, not
State B imposes high taxes
on mobile capital assets
State A imposes high
taxes on mobile capital
assets
State A does not impose
taxes on mobile capital
assets
39

A = In(50%), Rev(high)
B = In(50%), Rev(high)

State B does not
impose taxes on mobile
capital assets
A = In(0%), Rev(0)
B = In(100%), Rev(0)

A = In(100%), Rev(0)
B = In(0%), Rev(0)

A = In(50%), Rev(0)
B = In(50%), Rev(0)

Michael S. Lebovitz & Theodore P. Seto, The Fundamental Problem of International
Taxation, 23 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 529, 535 (2001). This taxpayers’ group
comprises mainly commercial parties that operate in several jurisdictions and also, to
a lesser extent, affluent individuals with liquid or mobile assets. Such actors are able
to utilize the loss of regulatory control on domestic capital resources to induce
sovereigns to compete for foreign investment by eroding traditionally “fixed
(political) costs” of conducting business. Understood in the context of global
regulation, competition through tax policy — once considered a symbol of national
sovereignty — may be perceived not as an exception, but rather as an indication of
the peak of the regulatory competition trend. See J. Hackett, Overview and Summary
of Discussions on the Policy Implications of Recent Tax Reforms on Investment Flows
Between Member and Non-Member Countries, in TAXATION AND INTERNATIONAL
CAPITAL FLOWS 72, 73 (1990); Malcolm Gammie, International Tax Avoidance: A UK
Perspective, 28 INTERTAX 267, 274 (2000).
40
Harry Grubert, Tax Planning by Companies and Tax Competition by
Government, in INTERNATIONAL TAXATION AND MULTINATIONAL ACTIVITY 113, 115
(James R. Hines Jr. ed., 2001).
41
Rosanne Altshuler et al., Has U.S. Investment Abroad Become More Sensitive
to Tax Rates?, in INTERNATIONAL TAXATION AND MULTINATIONAL ACTIVITY 9
(James R. Hines Jr. ed., 2001) (suggesting that there was a growing Foreign Direct
Investment sensitivity to effective corporate tax rates during the 1984–1992 period);
James R. Hines, Jr., Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL TAXATION AND
MULTINATIONAL ACTIVITY 1, 7 (James R. Hines, Jr. ed., 2001). Cf. Jack M. Mintz,
Has U.S. Investment Abroad Become More Sensitive to Tax Rates? Comment, in
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION AND MULTINATIONAL ACTIVITY 32 (James R. Hines Jr.
ed., 2001) (suggesting that the optimal evaluation standard of the analysis presented
in the previous study should have been the effective tax rate on marginal investment
rather than the average effective tax rate).
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traditionally perceived as tax havens, to take tax competition
considerations into account when formulating their tax systems.
C. Four Key Problems in Taxing Financial Income
The accelerating mobility of assets during the last fifty years is an
inevitable byproduct of a number of overall positive developments.
These developments include the aforementioned telecommunication
and computation advancements, overall pro-capitalist political
stability, and the expansion of international financial markets. They
allow taxpayers to place financial assets in one jurisdiction while
controlling them from another. These developments, however,
negatively impact tax authorities’ ability to levy taxes on financial
assets. This article identifies four main problems derived directly from
42
the mobility of financial assets in the global economy.
First, MNEs defer taxation on financial assets held by subsidiaries
in low-tax jurisdictions. By avoiding repatriation of subsidiaries’
earnings, and by using hybrid entities to avoid Subpart F anti-deferral
legislation, MNEs are able to transfer liquid financial assets of their
foreign subsidiaries through low-tax havens.
Second, MNEs use sophisticated networks of hybrid entities and
43
financial flows to repatriate excessive tax credits. Under section 902,
the foreign tax credit attached to subsidiaries’ dividends is determined
as their total uncredited post-1986 tax liability multiplied by the
amount of dividends and divided by their total post-1986 earnings and
profits (E&P). This reveals a simple, yet interesting mathematical
relationship: when a subsidiary’s E&P decreases, the proportion of
foreign taxes (and foreign tax credits) attached to its dividends
increases. Therefore, to generate excessive foreign credit capacity,
MNEs try to have as much of their income as possible classified as
44
foreign sourced by manipulating the source rules. This change of
42

There are other major tax avoidance avenues — such as inversion transactions
intended to avoid residency taxation and the creation of artificial losses — that this
article does not address. While these techniques definitely involve the deployment of
financial assets, the core abuse is not associated with the mobility of financial assets,
but with the uneconomic substance of the corporate residency concept (which allows
corporations to escape residency taxation easily) and the incongruence between
financial and tax accounting, which enhance the profitability of tax losses.
43
See Paul W. Osterhuis, The Evolution of International Tax Policy — What
Would Larry Say?, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 10 (2007) (explaining how MNEs used
hybrids to avoid Subpart F anti-deferral rules).
44
For example, taxpayers can use section 863(b)(2) to assure that a higher
percentage of the income they derive from their exports is foreign sourced. By
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classification in and of itself does not reduce MNEs’ tax liabilities
because MNEs are subject to tax on their worldwide income.
However, it creates an income source that “could be credited” with
45
foreign tax credits. This type of planning requires MNEs to take
advantage of numerous incongruencies between United States and
foreign tax accounting rules to develop techniques for reducing their
subsidiaries’ E&P. To achieve this E&P reduction, MNEs utilize
affiliated financial transactions extensively. This allows them to create
“pockets” of subsidiaries with low and high E&Ps. Finally, MNEs
repatriate dividends selectively — only from those subsidiaries that, as
a result of planning, have low E&P and paid a lot of foreign taxes in
the past. When dividends are paid from these subsidiaries, a small
amount of dividends “carry” with them substantial tax credits. With
these (artificial) credits, MNEs reduce taxes on income from foreign
sources (e.g., royalties and sales) of corporate entities that are United
States tax residents. To the extent that MNEs exercise all three
planning components effectively, they can credit much of their tax
liability. Financial transactions are not the only way MNEs generate
excessive tax credits. MNEs can use an array of tax planning tools to
manipulate their foreign subsidiaries’ E&P and tax pools to generate
higher foreign tax credits capacity. However, financial assets’’
mobility and fungibility make related financial transactions the
cheapest, most readily available, and most effective planning tool for
this type of credit-generating technique.
Third, MNEs utilize capital fungibility to structure related
financial transactions with favorable tax results. By controlling their
internal financial structures, MNEs shift income to jurisdictions where
they face low effective tax rates and deductions to jurisdictions where
they face high effective tax rates. This problem is connected with
MNEs’ ability to avoid withholding taxes on these related financial
transactions.
Finally, taxpayers evade tax by investing financial holdings in
offshore centers without reporting earnings on these holdings to their
residence jurisdictions. This problem connects directly to taxpayers’
ability to avoid withholding source taxes on their portfolio
investments and foreign bank account holdings. The following table
formulating a related partnership that buys the exports (from the MNE) and sells
them as inventory to consumers abroad, an MNE can improve on the 50/50 rule
prescribed under the regulations of section 865.
45
Once the relative amount of foreign-sourced income increases, there is also an
increase in the foreign tax credit limitation determined by section 904 — so that
MNEs can claim a larger amount of foreign tax credits overall.
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provides a taxonomy of the aforementioned issues according to
factors that will be significant in the article’s subsequent analysis.
TABLE 1. TAXONOMY OF THE FOUR MAJOR PROBLEMS
IN TAXING FINANCIAL INCOME

No

Primarily sourcing
or residency
tax issue?
Residency

Primarily
associated
with MNEs?
Yes

No

Residency

Yes

No

Sourcing

Yes

Yes

Residency

No

Carries criminal
liability?*
Deferral
Credit
repatriation
Related
transactions
Unreported
income

* This category deals with per se criminality. Nevertheless, some of the categories
mentioned as not triggering criminal liabilities may be executed in an aggressive way
recognized as a criminal violation of the tax law.

Of the four aforementioned problems, that of unreported income
is somewhat confined by a number of factors. First, although MNEs
may engage in tax evasion, the problem of evasion is not categorically
related to MNEs. Second, the remedy — extensive multilateral
information sharing — has been known from the very beginning of the
IITR. This is not to suggest that implementing a multilateral
information sharing policy is easy. It does suggest, however, that the
major advancement on this issue is most likely to be made on political
46
and technological levels rather than on an analytical level. While this
article refrains from addressing the tax evasion issue directly, it is

46

See generally Cynthia Blum, Sharing Bank Deposit Information with Other
Countries: Should Tax Compliance or Privacy Claims Prevail?, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 579,
598 (2004) (mentioning that tax havens with bank secrecy laws play an important role
in concealing illegitimate transactions); G. Scott Dowling, Fatal Broadside: The
Demise of Caribbean Offshore Financial Confidentiality Post USA PATRIOT Act, 17
TRANSNAT’L LAW 259, 285–93 (2004) (explaining how fear of being associated with
terrorism motivates tax-havens to erode their bank secrecy laws); Suzanne Walsh,
Taxation of Cross-Border Interest Flows: The Promises and Failures of the European
Union Approach, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 251 (2005) (arguing that there is a
convergence of interests — ranging from money laundering and anti-terrorism to tax
evasion — that motivates Western countries to obtain information about offshore
financial centers); Bruce Zagaris, Increasing Cooperation of International Tax
Enforcement and Anti-Money-Laundering Enforcement, 32 TAX NOTES INT’L 649, 659
(Nov. 17, 2003) (describing how major information sharing provisions were enacted as
part of the PATRIOT Act).
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important to connect its information sharing remedy with the
remedies to the other three problems. As in the case of tax evasion,
any attempt to counter the other three problems of taxing financial
income would have to establish, as a prerequisite, a framework of
cooperation between sovereigns. This cooperation should facilitate
transparency with regard to financial holdings of the vast majority of
international investors. Hence, while the problem of tax evasion could
be separated analytically, from a practical perspective its solution
intertwines with measures that the article offers to redress other issues
identified in this section.
In the next part, the article analyzes important developments
related to the problem of income shifting. In subsequent parts, the
article offers its alternative proposal for dealing with the problem of
income shifting. The article’s analysis also discusses how its proposal
redresses the other two problems this part identifies: deferral and
excessive credit repatriation.
III. PICKING UP THE GAUNTLET? THE RUDIMENTS OF AN
ALLOCATION PHASE REGARDING FINANCIAL INCOME
A. Stages in the Development of Interest Taxation
This part addresses the descriptive claim of the article that there is
a growing readiness among different policymakers to consider
methods that depart from current IITR conventions for sourcing
MNEs’ interest and financial income. The article refers to this
readiness as the possible emergence of an Allocation Phase. It is an
expansion of the historical argument made in a previous article, which
claims that the source tax base of capital income has been eroded
because of considerations that focused too strongly on the importance
47
of trade enhancement. It further claims that after the Cold War, tax
authorities developed a new anti-avoidance paradigm that tried to
combat source tax erosion by distinguishing between legitimate and
abusive tax planning. This paradigm has been unsuccessful in
reversing or slowing down source erosion tendencies for two reasons.
First, tax authorities lack a conceptual base through which they could
determine coherently what the fair source-base allocation for inbound
investments should be. Second, the methodologies developed by tax
authorities to filter abusive transactions are ineffective because they
are based on the arm’s-length standard. The transactional emphasis of
this standard necessitates a lot of ad hoc, fact-laden, case-specific
47

Benshalom, supra note 1.
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inquiries with grave administrative (and compliance) costs.
This part traces a new tendency in the IITR’s policy-making
regarding the taxation of financial income. It surveys briefly the
reformulation of the rules intended to combat thin-capitalization of
MNEs’ subsidiaries in high-tax jurisdictions. It labels this potentially
new policy trend as the Allocation Phase, hoping that it represents the
beginning of an emerging new sourcing paradigm in the IITR. The
features of this phase reflect IITR policymakers’ recognition that the
main challenge and duty of the IITR is not to eliminate abusive
transactions but to develop economically sound, administrable, and
fair sourcing allocation methods of financial income. This part focuses
on income shifting, which is considered a key issue because of the
broad scope of abuse and the enormous compliance and
administrative burdens it imposes.
B. Earnings-Stripping/Thin-Capitalization Case Study:
Some Winds of Change
The issue of thin-capitalization (or earnings-stripping, as it is
called in the United States) was addressed by the previously
mentioned research as a case study for the inadequacies of the anti48
avoidance paradigm. It is, therefore, worthwhile to review briefly the
distinctive features of the thin-capitalization problem as well as tax
authorities’ attempts to address it.
Relatively low (source) withholding taxes laid upon proceeds of
debt transactions make the economics of those debt transactions
lucrative every time there is a jurisdictional mismatch, in which the
lender is a tax resident of a jurisdiction with lower tax rates than the
debtor. This is a combination of two factors. First, the debtor is able to
deduct the interest it pays from its otherwise highly-taxed income.
Second, the lender is subject only to low (or nonexistent) withholding
taxes (on the gross interest payments) on the source level and low
income taxes (on its net taxable income) in its country of residence.
From taxpayers’ perspectives, this finance structure offers a lower
(tax) cost for capital and is therefore superior to an equivalent
domestic debt transaction (in which the lender is exposed to high
49
income taxes) and to domestic and foreign equity investments.
This reveals the prima facie appeal of related debt financing due
48

Id.
In the case of equity investments, shareholder-investors bear at least some of
the corporate tax burden and are exposed to higher income and/or withholding tax
rates.
49
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to potential jurisdictional mismatches between the locations where
interest deductions and proceeds are recognized. By leveraging
operations in high-tax jurisdictions and borrowing from low-taxed
lenders, taxpayers may take advantage of interest expense
deductibility and negligible withholding taxes on interest to reduce
finance costs. This possibility is especially lucrative for MNEs, which
can engage in related debt transactions to finance subsidiaries in hightax jurisdictions while retaining corporate control. This loophole
stands at the center of this subpart’s analysis.
50

FIGURE 2. THE THIN-CAPITALIZATION TECHNIQUE

Subsidiary X:
(creditor)
$100 profits
$(-0) taxes paid
$100 net taxable
income

Country A: 0% ETR on
corporate income
The Thin-Capitalization
Problem

$100 Deductible interest
payments

MNE
Parent

Subsidiary Y:
(debtor)
$100 profits
$(-100) interest
exps.

$ 0 net taxable

Country B: 50% ETR
on corporate income

Conditions:
•
The three conditions of a
jurisdictional mismatch:
o
Difference in
effective source
corporate tax
rates
o
Low or negligible
withholding tax
rates
o
Payments that,
like interest, are
tax-deductible
•
Affiliation between
creditor and debtor

Country A and Country B impose, respectively, a 0% and a 50% effective tax rate (ETR) on all
sources of corporate income. A and B enter a double taxation treaty, which eliminates
withholding taxes on interest payments. X and Y are two subsidiaries of a single MNE that are
located in A and B respectively. In a given year, Y earns $100 from its business activities in
country B, which would be subject to a 50% tax rate leading to a tax liability of $50. The MNE
has a clear incentive to reduce its overall tax expenses. This can easily be done by financing Y’s
activities by X’s debt instruments. For instance, subsidiary X loans subsidiary Y $1000, carrying
the appropriate market rate of 10% annual interest. Y deducts the $100 interest payments from its
income and X, which is tax-indifferent because of A’s low ETR, reports them as income. This
way, Y’s income for that year is $0, and the MNE avoids $50 of source tax costs that would have
been laid on Y by B.

Tax authorities have developed methods limiting different
variations of this source tax avoidance scheme. These regimes
typically involve some hypothetical inquiries as to whether unrelated
parties would have entered into these types of financial transactions.
In cases where it is determined that unrelated parties would not have
entered into these transactions, the deduction of the interest payments
51
52
is disallowed. While the actual regimes differ substantially, they all
50
51

This figure was used in Benshalom, supra note 1, at 678.
Sometimes these interest payments are re-characterized as returns on equity
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suffer from the same fundamental problem. The arm’s-length
standard scalpels used by these regimes limit their ability to analyze
the problem of thin-capitalization. As an analytical tool, the arm’slength standard is a useful pricing technique that compares related
transactions to similar unrelated ones. It fails to provide a benchmark
for what the correct legal form of a related financial transaction
should be because there is no one “correct” form. Furthermore, as a
normative matter, the arm’s-length standard does not explain why
related creditors should be subject to the same favorable tax
consequences granted to unrelated creditors, when the former are not
truly subject to the high risks, especially credit risks, faced by the
53
latter.
The prevalent feeling that there are overwhelming cases of tax
abuse involving international transactions, along with the slim chance
that the anti-avoidance paradigm will ever overcome its throes, have
led some tax authorities to experiment with innovative anti-thincapitalization regimes. Sailing to terra incognita, some of these
experiments have abandoned traditional IITR arm’s-length
conventions. To avert the anti-avoidance pitfalls, these experiments
sought to anchor their decisive factors on the cruder attributes of
MNEs’ financial structure.
A number of tax authorities have been willing to re-encapsulate
their anti-thin-capitalization regimes while disregarding the
fundamental cornerstones of the anti-avoidance approach, which
distinguishes both between related and unrelated debt and between
foreign and domestic debt. This section explores these
experimentations briefly. The next section discusses whether they
mark a new phase in the IITR’s treatment of financial income.
1. The Attempt to Change the United States’ Earnings-Stripping
Regime
The discussion of the United States earnings-stripping regime
surfaced in light of the relatively high number of tax-motivated
54
corporate inversion transactions executed in 2002.
These
and thus subjected to corporate tax and, possibly, to different withholding tax rates.
52
Some rely on methods that emphasize the need for case-by-case inquiries;
others rely on the corporate debt-equity ratios as benchmarks; yet others scrutinize
shareholder debt-equity ratios. See Benshalom, supra note 1, at 683–85.
53
Id. (developing this point in much more detail).
54
See Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Expectations and Expatriations:
Tracing the Causes and Consequences of Corporate Inversions (Univ. of Mich. Ross
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transactions involved a replacement of an American parent
corporation with a foreign surrogate that was a resident of a tax
haven. The ability of the foreign surrogate to engage in earningsstripping by injecting related party debt into the former United States
parent and its subsidiaries was perceived as one of corporations’ long
55
term tax savings from the inversion. This provoked bipartisan
political attempts to amend the United States earnings-stripping
56
regime.
These attempts were eventually abandoned after
57
encountering harsh opposition from taxpayers’ lobbies.
Of the various attempts to reform the United States earningsstripping regime, the article focuses only upon one specific aspect of
the Bush Administration’s proposal. The Administration’s proposal
would have complemented the United States earnings-stripping
regime with an innovative interest-disallowance rule, which was
unrelated to the arm’s-length inquiry. This disallowance rule would
have been triggered every time a United States subsidiary was found
to be “disproportionately leveraged” in comparison with the entire
MNE group. Once triggered, the rule would have disallowed the
deduction of certain interest payments that the United States

Sch. of Bus. Office of Tax Policy Research, Working Paper Series No. 2002-04, June
2002), available at http://www.bus.umich.edu/otpr/expatriationsubmission.pdf; Hal
Hicks III, Overview of Inversion Transactions: Selected Historical, Contemporary, and
Transactional Perspectives, 30 TAX NOTES INT’L 899 (June 2, 2003) (analyzing the
main features of the 2002 inversion waves and stressing that, unlike inversions in
earlier years, recent inversions are characterized by the willingness of shareholders to
realize capital gain taxes to attain long term benefits of avoiding United States
residency taxation); Carol P. Tello, Inversion Transactions: New Style Transactions
Raise New Policy Issues, 43 TAX MGMT. MEMORANDUM 211 (2002) (providing a
thorough description of inversion transactions and some of the means by which
policy-makers sought to counter them).
55
Hicks, supra note 54, at 907, 915–16; Developments in the Law — Jobs and
Borders, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2171, 2278 (2005).
56
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., TECHNICAL
EXPLANATION OF H.R. 2896, THE “AMERICAN JOBS CREATION ACT OF 2003”, at 76–78
(Joint Comm. Print Aug. 13, 2003), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-72-03.pdf;
Diana L. Wollman, Recent U.S. Earning Stripping Proposals: Why Were the Doctors
Called and Is the Medicine Worse than the Disease?, 30 TAX NOTES INT’L 483, 494–96
(May 5, 2003) (describing the original “Thomas proposal,” which included a
disproportionate indebtedness test based on the worldwide leverage test).
57
See Mikael Norman & Mark Russell, Company Criticizes Earnings Stripping
Provisions, 2003 TNT 99-28 (Mar. 18, 2003); Organization for International
Investment, OFII White Paper on Related-Party Interest Payments, 2003 TNT 154-53
(Apr. 7, 2003).
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subsidiary made to related parties. The notion behind this measure
was that MNEs abuse the tax system even when they finance United
States activities with unrelated debt while financing other operations
in low-tax jurisdictions with equity investments. The underlying idea
seemed to be that MNEs use the deductibility of interest payments to
unfairly avoid the relatively high United States corporate tax rates on
their source income.
Unrelated parties that enter a debt transaction do not compare a
subsidiary’s level of leverage with that of the entire MNE group.
Hence, the Administration’s proposal anchored the abusiveness of its
disallowance rule to the notion of MNE managements’ control over
their entire pools of financial assets. This rule encapsulates the idea
that it is unfair for MNEs to disproportionately debt finance their
United States operations and deduct interest to reduce their United
States source income tax liabilities.
This article deviates from the general line of criticism against the
59
Administration’s proposal. It argues that the Administration’s
proposal was too limited because, even though it adopted a
disproportional leverage test, it resulted only in disallowing the
deduction of interest payments made to related parties. This
combination is inconsistent. The disproportional leverage test added
by the Administration’s proposal was innovative and challenging
precisely because it had nothing to do with related party transactions.
Therefore, it should not have been limited to disallowing only the
deduction of interest payments to related parties. Derivatively, the
new disallowance rule would have entailed enormous compliance,
Administration, and short term transition costs in return for a
relatively modest yield of expected revenues. The lesson is that, since
58

The disallowed interest was intended to be only the proportional amount of
related debt that would have been extracted from the disproportional leverage.
59
As many of its critics noted, the proposal involved a massive increase in tax
compliance costs. Additionally, some of its critics suggested that its deviation from the
arm’s-length standard discriminated against foreign MNEs. This concern was partly
justified because the new disallowance rule took into account only gross interest
payments of the United States subsidiaries when determining their disallowance. This
may have led to severe disallowance of interest expenses even in fiscal years when
taxpayers had a positive net interest income (this concern was valid mainly with
regard to the financial sector). These commentators further claimed that this type of
discrimination overrides United States anti-discrimination obligation under various
DTTs. See Harry L. Gutman et al., KPMG Urges Reconsideration of Proposals
Regarding Earnings-Stripping Provision, 2003 TNT 83-13 (May 1, 2003); Lawrence R.
Uhlick, Banking Group Discusses Earnings Stripping Proposal, 2003 TNT 59-33 (Feb.
14, 2003).
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the reformulations of IITR conventions are costly, tax reformers
should aspire to turn the tide rather than to do things in halves.
2. Australia and New Zealand’s Anti-Thin-Capitalization Legislation
New Zealand enacted its unique anti-thin-capitalization
legislation in 1996. In doing so, it was aware of the multiple forms in
which earnings-stripping may take place, as well as the difficulty of
separating transactions motivated by tax avoidance from “legitimate”
commercial ones. Accordingly, while restricted to deal with
subsidiaries of foreign investors, it was not restricted to examine
60
related debt exclusively. Rather, under the New Zealand thincapitalization rules, the interest deduction disallowance is triggered
when a subsidiary debt-asset ratio exceeds 3:4 and its indebtedness is
61
greater than 110% of the MNE’s overall indebtedness. The
overwhelming majority of companies avoid the compliance hurdles of
62
the thin-capitalization regime by meeting the debt-asset ratio.
In 2001, as part of a general revision of its income taxation of
business enterprises, Australia reformulated its anti-thincapitalization legislation along the general lines of the New Zealand
63
thin-capitalization rules. Interestingly, the Australian Treasury

60

Andrew M. C. Smith, New Zealand’s Thin Capitalization Rules, 44 CAN. TAX
J. 1525, 1525 (1996).
61
Grant Richardson et al., Thin Capitalization Rules: An Anglo-American
Comparison, 24 INT’L TAX J. 36, 48 (1998). Taxpayers are granted great flexibility in
choosing the manner by which this comparative indebtedness is calculated. Smith,
supra note 60, at 1540.
62
Richardson, supra note 61, at 50 (arguing that more than anything, New
Zealand’s thin-capitalization regime was intended to convey a clear message to MNEs
not to exceed the debt-asset ratio); Andrew M. C. Smith & Paul V. Dunmore, New
Zealand’s Thin Capitalization Rules and the Arm’s-Length Principle, 57 BULL. INT’L
FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 503, 510 (2003) (mentioning that, even before the thincapitalization legislation was enacted, most nonresident companies would not have
fallen within its ambit); Smith, supra note 60, at 1547.
63
The Australian legislation had a few exceptions. First, it provided a more
lenient ratio for financial institutions. Second, it covered parent corporations of
Australian MNEs, which were exempt under the former anti-thin-capitalization
legislation. REVIEW OF BUSINESS TAXATION, A TAX SYSTEM REDISIGNED 664 (1999),
available at http://www.rbt.treasury.gov.au/publications/paper4/download/Section22_
P.pdf (mentioning that the reason to include parent corporations of Australian MNEs
was motivated by the belief that those corporations could allocate disproportionably
excessive debt to their Australian operations). Finally, it provided relief to taxpayers
who could prove that their financial transactions would have been undertaken by
unrelated parties operating at arm’s-length. See generally Michael Wachtel,
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justified the reform by claiming that former thin-capitalization rules,
which scrutinized related foreign debt through arm’s-length lenses,
were unable to deal with problems associated with the major issue of
64
disproportionate leverage.
3. The European Experience with Member States’ Anti-ThinCapitalization Legislation
In the EU context, the attempt to limit the deduction of interest
payments to related parties presents an oddity. It runs against the
Commission’s directives that limit source taxation by prohibiting
withholding taxes on related dividend, interest, and royalty payments
65
between related parties that are residents of Member States.
Member States’ anti-thin-capitalization regimes clash with the EU’s
broader objective to reduce tax costs on financial flows in the internal
market. Thus, thin-capitalization rules aim to prevent the deduction of
the same interest payments that were exempt from withholding taxes
by the directives.
The most important development on this issue is the verdict
issued by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Lankhorst-Hohorst
66
GmbH. The ECJ found that the German anti-thin-capitalization
legislation infringed upon the Rome Treaty’s Freedom of
Establishment Clause and found no persuasive argument why, in the
case of thin-capitalization, Germany should be exempted from the
67
clause’s general application. In its decision, the ECJ seemed to have
Australia’s New Thin Capitalization Regime, 55 BULL. INT’L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION
380, 381, 387 (2003).
64
See generally REVIEW OF BUSINESS TAXATION, supra note 63, at 659
(“Australia’s current thin capitalization provisions are not fully effective at preventing
an excessive allocation of debt to the Australian operations of multinationals because
they refer only to foreign related party debt and foreign debt covered by a formal
guarantee rather than total debt.”).
65
Council Directive 90/435/EEC, 1990 O.J. (L 225) (EC); Council Directive
2003/49/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 157) (EU). The objective of thin-capitalization legislation —
to differentiate between domestic and foreign investment — may also seem
inconsistent with the EU’s kingpins of (free-trade related) free flow of capital and
freedom-of-establishment rights. See generally Markus Ernst, Toward a Level Playing
Field for Thin Capitalization: German and U.S. Approaches, 43 TAX NOTES INT’L 657,
659, 661 (Aug. 21, 2006) (discussing the European Court of Justice’s LankhorstHohorst GmbH decision).
66
Case C-324/00, Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH v. Finanzamt Steinfurt, 2002
E.C.R. I-11779.
67
Alex Cordewener, Company Taxation, Cross-Border Financing and Thin
Capitalization in the EU Internal Market: Some Comments on Lankhorst-Hohorst
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conveyed a clear message to the EU’s national legislators that thin68
capitalization cannot automatically be equated with tax avoidance.
To comply with the ECJ’s ruling, Germany has extended the
application of its thin-capitalization rules to all corporate entities and
to their debts — including to creditors that are tax residents of
Germany (where there is no concern of jurisdictional mismatch
69
problems). Recently, United Kingdom tax authorities proposed
70
changing their thin-capitalization rules along these lines.
C. The OECD and the Allocation of Profits for Branches
of Financial Institutions
Thin-capitalization is not the only example that suggests that
policymakers around the world recognize that the arm’s-length
standard is impractical in sourcing financial activities and preventing
income shifting. As elaborated upon in Part V.A, this difficulty
materializes at its extreme with respect to FMNEs (MNEs that are
financial intermediaries). Since FMNEs engage primarily in financial
transactions, tax authorities cannot break down their activities using
arm’s-length methodologies. Consequently, the OECD recognized
that the issue of allocating income from FMNE-affiliated transactions
GmbH, 43 EUR. TAX’N 102, 111–12 (2003); Lars-Erik Wenehed, Thin Capitalization
and EC Law, 30 TAX NOTES INT’L 1145, 1146 (June 16, 2003) (noting that “[a]ccording
to the ECJ, the German thin-capitalization legislation does not have a specific
purpose of preventing wholly artificial arrangements, designed to circumvent German
tax legislation, from attracting a tax benefit, but applies generally to any situation in
which the parent company is resident outside Germany.”).
68
Adam Craig et al., ECJ Renders Wide-Reaching Decision on German Thin
Capitalization Rules, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY 2002 WTD 240-2 (Dec. 13, 2002). This
broad interpretation of the Freedom-of-Establishment Clause places former German
anti-thin-capitalization legislation and similar Member State legislation in question.
Id.; see Oliver Roumelian, The End of French Thin Capitalization Rules?, 31
INTERTAX 244, 246–47 (2003). For a more general discussion of the impact of the
ECJ’s anti-discrimination tax jurisprudence, see Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren
Jr., Income Tax Discrimination and the Political and Economic Integration of Europe,
115 YALE L.J. 1186 (2006).
69
Ernst, supra note 65, at 661; see Rolf Schonbrodt & Uwe Woywode,
Treatment of Secured Unrelated-Party Loans Under German Thin Capitalization
Rules, 38 TAX NOTES INT’L 145 (Apr. 11, 2005) (describing how the thin-capitalization
legislation, specifically Section 8aKStG, was expanded to both resident and
nonresident shareholders, related parties, third party lenders, and debtor companies
as of 2004).
70
HM TREASURY, TAXATION OF COMPANIES’ FOREIGN PROFITS: DISCUSSION
DOCUMENT 19 (2007), available at http://www.hm-treasury.go.uk/media/E/9/
consult_foreign_profits020707.pdf.
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could not be left in its currently incoherent and arbitrary state.
In 1998, the OECD issued a report addressing the sourcing of
FMNEs engaged in global trading of securities and financial
71
instruments. In that report, the OECD recognizes the difficulty of
applying traditional arm’s-length methods that depend on the
existence of market comparables to affiliated transactions within
72
functionally integrated FMNEs. In particular, the 1998 OECD
Report identifies the problems associated with sourcing the residual
income from FMNEs, which is the income generated from the cost
savings associated with the integrated structure of FMNEs.
Additionally, it recognizes the difficulty of pricing accurately and
73
coherently the growing volume of FMNE-affiliated transactions.
Despite these observations, the 1998 OECD Report clings to the
traditional transactional transfer-pricing methods and restrains tax
74
authorities’ ability to use profit-allocation methods. Much in line
with the ideas expressed in the 1998 OECD Report, the United States
Treasury issued the proposed dealing regulations concerned with
75
taxing FMNEs engaged in securities dealing.
71

The OECD Report begins by defining entities engaged in “global trading” as
those who have “the capacity . . . to execute customers’ orders in financial products
[and sometimes to manage their own proprietary portfolios] in markets around the
world and/or around the clock.” ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT [OECD], THE TAXATION OF GLOBAL TRADING OF FINANCIAL
INSTRUMENTS 12 (Mar. 4, 1998). The OECD Report further elaborates on three
different models by which FMNEs may conduct their trading operations: (1)
integrated trading, in which an FMNE has a single trading book passed between
different locations; (2) centralized product management, in which an FMNE assigns
all market risks for a particular line of products to a specific location while allowing
the marketing of that asset to take place also in other locations; and (3) separate
enterprise trading, in which each branch and entity within an FMNE has its own
trading and proprietary books. Id. at 19–20.
72
Id. at 29–30.
73
Id. at 42.
74
The OECD report stresses that the profit-split method, the only method that
allocates income by net profits and is not based on market comparables, is to be used
only as an option of last resort. Id. at 53–56. It distinguishes between two types of
profit-splits: net profit-split and residual profit-split. Id. at 43 (providing that, while
under the net profit-split the entire profit will be allocated by the profit-split formula,
the residual profit-split method will first reward less integrated functions according to
transactional transfer-pricing methodologies).
75
The Proposed Dealing Regulations (Proposed Regulations) set out to resolve
a number of features (e.g., the broad definition of effectively connected income and
the nonrecognition of transactions with foreign branches), but most of them were not
directly related to the dilemma of whether an arm’s-length standard is a suitable
mechanism for sourcing these transactions. The Proposed Regulations apply four
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The 1998 OECD Report was followed by a series of reports that
dealt with the attribution of profits to branches. Unlike other types of
MNEs, FMNEs operate through branches rather than subsidiaries for
76
better compliance with financial regulations. Accordingly, in 2006,
the OECD issued another report (the Report), which contained a
general part and two parts that address banking and financial
77
instrument trading. The final version of the fourth (and last) part of
the Report, dealing with the insurance sector, is scheduled to be
published soon.
No new canon emerged from the Report. Its working hypothesis
is that branches should be treated as if they were functionally separate
entities. This, by and large, aligns with traditional arm’s-length
inquiries as to how to isolate branches as if they were entities and how
to price branch dealings, both with the parent company and with other
branches. Derivatively, it engages in a lot of arm’s-length inquiries as

transfer-pricing methodologies and adhere to the best-method rule. Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.482-8(a)(1), 63 Fed Reg. 11177 (Mar. 6, 1998). The first three methods are not
fundamentally different from traditional arm’s-length transfer-pricing methods. See
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-8(b)–(d), 63 Fed Reg. 11177 (Mar. 6, 1998). The fourth
method is an elaborated profit-split allocation methodology, which contains examples
specifically tailored to various dealing operations. It prescribes that the net income of
the activity should be attributed to each jurisdiction according to the contribution of
each branch/entity. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-8(e), 63 Fed Reg. 11177 (Mar. 6, 1998).
The term “contribution” is not defined in the Proposed Regulations and is therefore
to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-8(e)(3), 63 Fed
Reg. 11177 (Mar. 6, 1998). It also suggests a residual profit-split method, which
requires that routine contributions be compensated under ordinary transactional
transfer-pricing methods prior to the formulary allocation of net profits among
participants. Unlike other expenses, interest expenses are sourced through an assetbased formula to be attributed against foreign income, as prescribed by Code
section 864(e) and the relevant regulations.
76
Most MNEs do not operate through branches (unless they have losses)
because operating through subsidiaries provides them with limited liability, tax
deferral, and foreign credit planning opportunities. On the other hand, FMNEs tend
to operate through branches because of the capital adequacy requirements of
financial regulation (CARs). These regulations require that a financial institution
have a minimal amount of equity capital to support its operation in order to reduce
financial institutions’ incentives to over-leverage their operations. The CARs reduce
financial instability and the chances of systemic collapse. To arrange their assets
flexibly, an FMNE typically operates as one legal entity so that its equity supports its
worldwide operations.
77
OECD, REPORT ON THE ATTRIBUTION OF PROFITS TO PERMANENT
ESTABLISHMENTS PARTS I (GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS), II (BANKS) AND III
(GLOBAL TRADING) (2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/55/14/
37861293.pdf.
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to how to determine the branch’s risk exposure, creditworthiness, and
freestanding capital.
However, while adhering to “old” arm’s-length rhetoric, the
OECD inserted two somewhat subversive notions in the Report,
which erode the arm’s-length paradigm. First, the Report states that
tax authorities should allocate functions to FMNE branches according
78
to the “significant people” operating in each branch. Second, the
Report ties the first step and the attribution of income generating
assets to the branches. The combination of these two steps highlights
the importance of allocating functions to a branch according to its
“significant people” in determining the income allocated to it. It
further mentions that this asset allocation would reflect the relative
79
share of each branch in overall FMNE income. From this emerges an
innovative idea that deviates from the arm’s-length standard. It
suggests that income should be allocated according to the functions
that people in different branches perform, and not according to risk
shifting contractual settings that unrelated parties may have endorsed.
However, after introducing this idea, the Report retreats. It states that
once functions and assets have been identified, the internal dealings
among the branches should be sourced according to old transferpricing methods — cumbersome and futile as they have proven to be.
To date, it is difficult to assess the impact of the Report on future
sourcing of FMNEs. The Report leaves taxpayers and sovereigns
much flexibility and discretion in implementing the rules. Hence, it is
difficult to know which idea will leave its mark: the old rhetoric or the
new allocation-by-significant-people method. Nevertheless, the
Report shows that the OECD clings to its “better the devil we know”
transfer-pricing policy by rejecting any serious evaluation of
comprehensive unitary or formulary solutions. It is doubtful that
OECD officials believed it feasible to break down the enormous
volumes of affiliated transactions within FMNEs on a transactional
80
basis. This adherence to the status quo could be explained by the
OECD’s tendency to exercise political caution as a response to the
strong opposition of the financial sector to any mandatory unitary (or
81
profit-splitting) allocation mechanisms. Nevertheless, even though
78

Id. at 14–15.
Id.
80
Lee A. Sheppard, Gremlins in the Global U.S. Dealing Regulations, 25 TAX
NOTES INT’L 431, 434 (Feb. 4, 2002).
81
American Bankers Association, American Bankers Association Comments on
Discussion Draft on the Taxation of Global Trading of Financial Instruments, 14 TAX
NOTES INT’L 2011 (June 16, 1997) (stressing the importance of respecting the form of
79
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the OECD initiatives avoid any serious consideration of the arm’slength standard, they also promote the notion that allocation of
financial income requires a broad-reaching and practical solution in
the near future. Even though not explicitly stated, it is also evident
that this solution is not to be found in traditional arm’s-length
standard inquiries.
D. Allocation Phase: Some Final Remarks
The Allocation Phase is in the initial stages of taking form.
Nevertheless, the development in thin-capitalization and branch
allocation rules reviewed by this part reflects the recognition that the
problem of sourcing financial income may not be solved on the
quicksand of the ad hoc arm’s-length standard approach.
Furthermore, the thin-capitalization example suggests that the
different sourcing problems associated with MNEs’ financial
structures (e.g., affiliated lending and disproportional leverage)
cannot be insulated from one another.
While the problems of the arm’s-length approach are not confined
to the taxation of financial income, this article explores whether the
allocation of financial income within related settings could be
addressed separately. Policymakers’ growing recognition that MNEs’
manipulation of financial assets is a major source of abuse motivates
the article’s agenda. Its analysis offers a comprehensive multi-layered
reform of this specific issue and hopes to contribute to a reform
process that may occur in the foreseeable future.
IV. FRAMING THE PROBLEM: WHY ARE FINANCIAL
TRANSACTIONS SPECIAL?
A. The Unique Characteristics of Mobility and Fungibility
Financial transactions are unique in practice but not in theory. In
theory, almost every type of tax reduction plan that uses affiliated
financial transactions could be executed via other types of affiliated
transactions. For example, MNEs can strip income through leasing
transactions; they can shift income by inflating prices and risks
associated with non-financial affiliated transactions.
In practice, however, a few unique features make the sourcing of
the transactions themselves, and objecting to the emphasis of the OECD Paper on the
factor of human capital, which, as discussed later, is a classical unitary factor for the
purpose of profit-split allocation).
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financial transactions the spinal column of many tax planning
transactions: their mobility, their fungibility, and the tax-sensitivity of
financial markets.
With the exception of intangibles, a topic this author addressed in
82
a different paper, financial assets are the most mobile assets. They
are costless to deploy and store and therefore could be utilized from
almost any jurisdiction with stable political, monetary, and financial
regulatory regimes. Furthermore, financial assets are used by every
type of business and are executed through sophisticated and tax83
efficient financial markets. Professionals operating in financial
markets have developed tax planning cultures, where they market
their expertise to create products that attain tax planning objectives as
an inherent part of their services.
As described in Part II.B, the fungibility of financial assets
nullifies tax authorities’ attempt to determine the appropriate price
for financial transactions. Taxpayers can hybridize, bifurcate, and
synthesize similar financial flows in numerous ways to attain the most
tax-efficient results. The business integration of many MNEs hedges
contractual risk shifting by affiliated financial transactions. Unlike
unrelated parties, between which the consequences of risk shifting
84
through financial engineering may be vital, and therefore costly,
MNEs may inflate the price of certain transactions, knowing that the
risk borne by them would not change as a whole. With few
85
exceptions, MNEs bear no substantial economic costs of structuring
their internal financial flows one way or the other. Tax authorities do
not have the resources to audit the increasing volumes of affiliated
financial transactions because the arm’s-length standard requires them
to find the proper market comparables of specifically tailored
financial flows.
82

Ilan Benshalom, Sourcing the “Unsourceable”: The Cost Sharing Regulations
and the Sourcing of Affiliated Intangible-Related Transactions, 26 VA. TAX REV. 631
(2007).
83
In this environment, professionals specialize in designing the most taxfavorable instruments for different taxpayers — often through the use of financial
intermediaries and taxpayers with low (or no) tax-sensitivity (e.g., tax-exempt foreign
residents or Marked-to-Market taxpayers).
84
For example, when parties construct equity derivatives, those derivatives
typically face different credit risks and different rights in insolvency, and do not entail
shareholder voting power. These different features affect the risk and price that
parties undertake when buying these derivatives as opposed to equity derivatives.
85
For example, consider cases of insolvency and cases where the subsidiaries
have to comply with debt-equity regulations (such as the CAR regulations in the
financial sector).
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To summarize this point, for MNEs, affiliated financial
instruments are the ultimate tax planning device. They could be used
by entities at any place operating in any line of business. The
engineering possibilities are endless, their economic and audit risks
exposure is negligible, and the tax planning expertise for these
transactions is readily available. As a result, MNEs can manipulate
the sourcing of income derived from affiliated financial transactions
and use them, almost freely, for stripping and deferring income as well
as for generating foreign tax credits. What could possibly be better?
B. Framing the Solution
The solution advocated by this article challenges the traditional
convention, which regards the two methods by which MNEs’ affiliated
transactions are sourced: the arm’s-length standard and the
86
unitary/formulary methods, as almost mutually exclusive. The article
argues that tax authorities should source MNEs using both arm’slength and formulary methods. Arm’s-length methods adequately
source most MNE non-financial affiliated transactions, which have
market comparables; therefore, tax authorities have a legitimate
interest in continuing to use them for these types of transactions.
However, because of their unique features, affiliated financial
transactions should instead be sourced through unitary or formulary
sourcing conventions.
Under unitary methods, an MNE’s total taxable income is
aggregated and then sourced by an allocation formula among the
jurisdictions in which it operates. Formulary methods allocate income
in a similar way, although they do not aggregate MNEs’ entire
income, but only income derived from specific sources. While the
mechanics of the unitary and formulary arrangements are described in
the following parts, the evaluation of the article’s analysis requires
elucidating the normative framework of the unitary/formulary
alternative beforehand. The article justifies the shift from arm’s-length
to formulary methods due to the following four reasons.
First, the unitary sourcing method taxes income on a territorial
rather than on a worldwide basis. After the entire income of an MNE
is aggregated, it is allocated to the different jurisdictions where it is

86

The binary distinction between these two alternatives favors the status quo, in
which the arm’s-length standard is used. While there is consensus about the
deficiencies of the arm’s-length standard, the impracticality of a multilateral or
unilateral implementation of a unitary system garners even more consensus.
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taxed once. Any shift to a formulary sourcing arrangement
strengthens the concept of source over residency taxation. This shift
toward a more territorial system merits discussion. As the author has
88
written elsewhere,
scholars and politicians still debate whether
income tax should be imposed on a worldwide or territorial basis.
However, from a realist political perspective, it seems as though the
issue has already been resolved in the United States in favor of
territorialism. The recent IITR tax reform proposal of the Bush
Administration emphasized the shift to a simpler territorial dividend
exemption tax regime to increase revenues and competitiveness for
United States businesses. This aligns well with other recent years’
89
Code amendments that erode residency taxation. Although there
have also been some recent proposals to reduce deferral and expand
90
worldwide taxation, these proposals suffer from low political viability
because they go against sovereigns’ growing tendency to erode
residency taxation. Thus, even if the United States had the political
will, it might not succeed in changing the international current. Unless
the United States can swim against this current by itself, it seems
likely that the present United States IITR will be replaced with a
much more territorial tax regime. Nonetheless, there is no guarantee
that such a reform will take place in the near future. This article does
not directly address whether there is a normative justification for
taxing foreign sourced income through a residual residence tax.
However, the low political viability of the residual worldwide tax,
along with its extremely low revenue yields, lead the article to
conclude that it is worthwhile to start thinking about how a viable
territorial sourcing regime should operate. The article’s formulary
methods offer a viable and more territorial alternative to the current
tax regime that resonates well with contemporary political currents.
87

Even though all unitary systems operating today are territorial, a unitary
method does not have to be purely territorial. Theoretically, the allocation formula
can also account for factors that indicate corporate residency such as the location of
headquarters or place of incorporation.
88
Benshalom, supra note 82, at 633–34.
89
Robert J. Peroni et al., Getting Serious About Curtailing Deferral of U.S. Tax
on Foreign Source Income, 52 SMU L. REV. 455, 492 (1999) (claiming that, since 1996,
the subpart F anti-deferral regime provides taxpayers with an ever-expanding deferral
privilege); see I.R.C. §§ 954(c)(6), 965; see also I.R.C. § 904(d)(1) (eliminating, as of
2007, the eight-basket system in favor of a two-basket system that allows much more
cross-crediting, which will reduce the actual taxes levied from residents’ foreign
income).
90
Reuven Avi-Yonah, The Ingenious Kerry Tax Plan, 103 TAX NOTES 477 (Apr.
26, 2004) (describing the Kerry plan to curb deferral).
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Second, the current IITR treatment of affiliated financial
transactions is broken beyond repair. In fact, the arm’s-length
standard is so inept at dealing with these transactions that tax
authorities already employ quasi-unitary alternatives. One alternative
used frequently is the profit-split transfer-pricing method. Tax
authorities use this method to bifurcate the income of functionally
integrated MNEs. It requires the different MNE entities to split the
total income derived from an activity according to each party’s
contribution. It aggregates the income derived from the activity and
then divides this aggregated figure among the relevant parties. This is
very different from the traditional arm’s-length inquiry, which
hypothesizes how unrelated parties would price the transaction.
Compliance with this nontransparent case-by-case formulary
allocation mechanism is costly for both taxpayers and tax authorities
because it is amorphous as a matter of policy design. It depends on
documentation and fact-finding requirements. It is also biased in favor
of taxpayers, given tax authorities’ inferior information and lack of
audit and litigation resources. Furthermore, the particularity of the
profit-split analysis, as well as taxpayers’ ability to partially control
whether and how to apply it, render it difficult to generate any general
principles out of it. As mentioned earlier, the OECD also deviates
from the arm’s-length standard in its discussion of the branch
91
allocation rules.
Tax authorities have de facto abandoned traditional arm’s-length
standard methods with regard to the hard-to-source income
92
generating activities of MNEs. Hence, they have a lot to gain and
little to lose by making this explicit and shifting to formulary
allocation. A unitary proposal would use general, transparent, hardto-manipulate and easy-to-observe indicators to determine the
relative volume of an MNE’s activities in each jurisdiction in which it
operates. It would reduce taxpayers’ ability to shift income as well as
the compliance costs of transfer-pricing. To be sure, unitary
arrangements are not free from compliance costs, tax reduction
possibilities, or investment distortions. However, compared to the
current transfer-pricing regime, the formulary arrangements proposed
by this article provide equitable and coherent sourcing arrangements
with low compliance costs.
Third, the unitary system incentivizes MNEs to utilize their

91

See OECD, supra note 79 and accompanying text.
For example, the proposed dealing regulations emphasize the use of the
profit-split method. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-8(e), 63 Fed. Reg. 11177 (Mar. 6, 1998).
92
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resources flexibly and in a centralized and efficient manner.
Formulary allocation methods allocate MNEs’ income by relying on
hard-to-manipulate indicators tied to specific geographic locations. If
MNEs cannot escape the taxes on their financial activities by
sheltering them in low-tax jurisdictions or by avoiding repatriating
funds, they are free to utilize their assets efficiently without taking tax
considerations into account. Thus, once fiscal ownership is fixed,
MNEs would be able to utilize their financial assets in a centralized
(tax-indifferent) manner. A difficult-to-manipulate and easy-tocomply-with unitary regime would thus reduce both compliance costs
and post-investment tax distortions. This article does not participate
in what is essentially a political debate over the proper effective tax
rate that should be imposed on income derived from financial
activities and financial assets. It does, however, suggest that the
proper way sovereigns should determine MNEs’ effective tax burden
is by instituting tax-rate adjustments and not by creating blemish
source rules that erode the MNE tax base.
Fourth, unitary systems disregard affiliated transactions. In the
context of affiliated financial transactions, this feature of the unitary
formula means that financial transactions could not be used in MNEs’
tax planning schemes. As established in the previous section, this will
not prevent MNEs from engaging in intra-group tax planning, but it
will deprive them of the most useful tool for doing so. The shift to a
unitary system has important positive externalities beyond the
prevention of income shifting. This shift would make many of the
current schemes, which rely on affiliated financial transactions, less
available, less effective, and more costly so that they are not as
lucrative for MNEs to pursue.
This article’s argument that tax authorities should source
affiliated financial transactions through formulary rather than arm’slength methods depends primarily on one key issue: the nature of the
allocation formula. This formula should strike a careful balance
between concerns about audit accuracy, anti-abuse, and tax
administration. There is an inevitable tension between concerns of tax
administration, which require simplicity of rules, and concerns of audit
accuracy, which require adjustability and particularity. Anti-abuse
concerns sometimes require broad and simplified rules to prevent an
array of potential abuses. On other occasions, they require
adjustability so as to counter innovative tax planning schemes. The
following parts’ analysis explores this tension in great detail. When
exploring the outstanding issues through which this balance comes to
the fore, this article adheres to the following framework. First, it
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identifies the most accurate way to conduct the audit. Second, it
makes a number of assumptions as to how the specific aspects of the
formula should be modified to be reasonably administrated. Third, it
tries to examine the impact of simplification through anti-avoidance
lenses and makes the proper adjustments. Finally, it examines whether
the overall solution it recommends produces intuitively correct
allocation results.
C. The Unitary Alternative to the Arm’s-Length Standard
The unitary system comprises two separate steps. The first is an
income calculation step. In the unitary system, income is calculated
jointly for an entire MNE and not separately for each of its branches
and entities. To calculate their income, MNEs’ tax filings include a
consolidated report of their entire earnings rather than separate
reports for each of their entities. This consolidated reporting
effectively disregards affiliated transactions. After MNEs’ income is
calculated comes the second income allocation step. Here, MNEs’
income is distributed among the different jurisdictions in which they
operate according to an appropriation formula. This formula adopts
what may seem to be easy-to-observe and difficult-to-manipulate
factors (e.g., the amount of sales, payroll, and assets) as indicators of
the relative share of MNEs’ economic activity taking place in each
93
jurisdiction. Unitary systems do not prescribe identical tax rates
94
among different jurisdictions.
The underlying core idea of the unitary system is that there is no
one magic metric that penetrates the opaque process through which
MNEs generate their profitability. This opaqueness prescribes that
factors of the appropriation formula represent policy choices about
how to allocate tax rather than precise economic indicators of how
MNEs generate income. Unlike the arm’s-length standard, which tries
to source according to market benchmarks (of what unrelated parties
would do), the unitary sourcing regime aspires to tax MNEs’ income
only in near approximation. Tax authorities’ formulary
determinations of the proportional contribution of different factors to

93

Christina M. Lyons, The Constitutionality of the Worldwide Combined
Reporting Method of Taxation of Multinational Corporations: Barclays Bank v.
Franchise Tax Board, 37 B.C. L. REV. 183, 187–88 (1995).
94
See Peggy B. Musgrave, Sovereignty, Entitlement, and Cooperation in
International Taxation, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1335, 1344–46 (2001) (arguing for an
agreed-upon rate range to reduce incentives for source tax competition between
jurisdictions).
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MNEs’ profitability are by definition arbitrary. Furthermore, unitary
system sourcing is a crude averaging mechanism, disregarding the
different risk propensities and other distinctive circumstances of
95
various MNE investments. For example, under a unitary system it is
impossible for a profitable MNE to recognize loss in a specific
jurisdiction no matter how bad its performance is in that jurisdiction.
The most conceptually intriguing issue in the policy design of a
unitary system is the composition of the formula. To avoid the
daunting problems of the arm’s-length standard, the formulary factors
should be connected to immobile indicators of economic activity. As
previously mentioned, these factors may only serve as proxies for the
96
economic activity being taxed. Further, as with any tax assessment
criteria, the identification of formulary factors provides taxpayers with
97
the incentives to manipulate the indicators to minimize tax liability.
In the case of financial income, it is difficult to identify easy-toobserve and difficult-to-manipulate formulary indicators that
correlate with the conduct of economic activity. Indeed, the system
employed by the United States — a federal nation — to allocate
corporate income to different state governments refrains from
98
including financial income as part of the unitary tax base. This article
argues that this approach is wrong. Its main thesis is that the unitary
system would be most effective if employed to source hard-to-locate
financial activities.
Policymakers and academics often suggest formulary factors that
fail to meet the above-mentioned goals with regard to financial
income. For instance, FMNEs can easily manipulate one of the most
99
frequently mentioned formulary factors: sales. Because financial
95

Robert Ackerman & Elizabeth Chorvat, Modern Financial Theory and
Transfer-Pricing, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 637, 655–56 (2002).
96
See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation:
A Proposal for Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1349 (1996) (arguing that from a
tax perspective the jurisdiction of incorporation is a meaningless distinction).
97
See Jack M. Mintz, Globalizing the Corporate Income Tax: The Use of
Allocation, 56 FINANZARCHIV 388, 414–18 (1999).
98
UNIF. DIVISION OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT § 7 (1956); Walter
Hellerstein & Charles E. McLure, Jr., The European Commission’s Report on
Company Income Taxation: What the EU Can Learn from the Experience of the US
States, 11 INT’L TAX AND PUB. FIN. 199, 202 (2004).
99
Kimberly A. Clausing & Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Reforming Corporate
Taxation in a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment 14, 20
(The Brookings Inst., The Hamilton Project, Discussion Paper No. 2007-08, 2007); see
Charles E. McLure, Replacing Separate Entity Accounting and the Arm’s Length
Standard with Formulary Apportionment, 56 BULL. INT’L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION
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assets are mobile, sale transactions may be executed legally from any
of the locations in which a given FMNE is operating. A formulary
allocation method relying on sales would provide taxpayers with
incentives to finalize deals in tax havens. Tax authorities would find it
practically impossible to track where the economic sale of each
transaction occurred. This analysis has one important exception: retail
(lending and financial) services to individuals. It is relatively easy to
observe the location of retail transactions because the vast majority of
individuals borrow, lend, and consume financial services where they
live. This is very different from corporations, which can create
100
subsidiaries anywhere without incurring substantial costs.
Derivatively, when FMNEs contract with individuals, it is easy to
determine the geographic location of the sale. Audit accuracy, with
regard to income generated through FMNE retail activities, requires
that sales be part of the allocation formula. This way the formula
would reflect the geographic allocation of MNEs’ consumer-based
101
intangibles in different jurisdictions.
The problem with this
approach is that it requires taxpayers and tax authorities to bifurcate
FMNEs’ total income into the portion generated from individuals and
the portion generated from businesses. This would obviously create
potential compliance hurdles and, more importantly, allow FMNEs to
shift income between these two types of activities. Therefore, the
desirability of having two formulas — one to allocate income that
FMNEs derive from businesses and one to deal with income that they
derive from individuals (which would include sales) — is questionable.
Because tax authorities can not isolate these two sources of income
without generating too many compliance costs and abuse possibilities.
This article takes the view that this separation is too costly to
maintain. Furthermore, in the case of FMNEs, the article argues that
adding a sales factor is unnecessary because the factors on which it
choses to focus — tangible property and payroll — reflect, to a certain
degree, FMNE retail activities. Simply put, while some financial
services could be executed from foreign countries, if FMNEs wish to
reach individual clients in high-tax jurisdictions, they still have to

586, 593 (2002).
100
See, e.g., Benshalom, supra note 1, at 694 n.214 (reviewing the way
corporations created subsidiaries in the Netherlands Antilles to issue bonds to the
Eurobond markets while enjoying a low withholding tax rate that was reduced by the
double taxation treaty).
101
For example, FMNEs invest a lot to create consumer-based intangibles such
as goodwill. The best indicator of where this goodwill is located is the amount of sales
in each jurisdiction.
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invest in tangible property and experienced workforces in that
jurisdiction to run the operation. This may change over time as
internet banking becomes more popular. To the extent that this shift
takes place, it may be necessary to account for retail activity in a
different way.
Property and, moreover, financial assets are also considered
102
frequently as possible formulary benchmarks. When adopted as a
sourcing formulary factor, property should be attributed to the
location where it is employed rather than where it is owned, because
103
legal ownership is contractually mobile. Determining the geographic
location where assets are economically employed is extremely difficult
for intangibles and even more so for financial assets. It is doubtful
whether the ownership and risk-bearing propensities of these assets
could in fact be sourced analytically to a specific branch or entity
within an integrated MNE. Accordingly, while tangible property may
be attributed to various geographic locations, a different indicator
would have to be used to source the income derived out of an MNE’s
main pool of assets, which comprises capital and intangible assets.
The last indicator typically considered a formulary factor is
payroll. This factor assumes a correlation between income generated
and payroll costs incurred in a specific location. This article stresses
the importance of payroll as a key indicator of its appropriation
formulas. Like retail sales, the payroll factor is the aggregation of
relatively easy-to-observe contracts between MNEs and individuals.
However, unlike sales, payroll cannot be manipulated through
nonretail transactions because it could only be paid to individuals (this
article addresses the issue of outsourcing in detail later). In the
absence of a sales factor, payroll emerges as an important indicator as
to where MNE intangibles are geographically allocated. Goodwill,
successful retail activity, and production-based intangibles developed
by MNEs (e.g., risk management computer software) all require
human capital that to a great degree is reflected in the payroll factor.
To be sure, the payroll factor is not a perfect match to the sales factor
in determining the value of consumer-based intangibles. However,
MNEs’ ability to manipulate sales makes payroll the most attractive
alternative.
Ideally, the definition of the payroll factor should be broad in two

102

McLure, supra note 99, at 593; OECD, supra note 77 at 15–16 (tying much of
its analysis to the attribution of capital financial assets and risks).
103
See Charles E. McLure, Corporate Tax Harmonization in the European
Union: The Commission’s Proposals, 36 TAX NOTES INT’L 775, 786 (Aug. 31, 2004).
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important respects. First, it should encompass the compensation paid
by MNEs for a broad range of services provided by their employees,
as well as independent contractors. Second, the calculation of payroll
should include all types of costs associated with labor, including costs
of benefits and social security contributions. This broadness
guarantees that the payroll factor reflects the actual level of economic
activity taking place in specific jurisdictions. If tax authorities treat
independent contractors and employees differently, MNEs would
manipulate these categories. For example, if compensation for
independent contractors is not included in the unitary calculations,
MNEs will reduce their tax liabilities in high-tax countries by
outsourcing many services they purchase. The same is true if tax
authorities treat various types of compensation differently. If, for
instance, compensation in the form of stock options is excluded from
the formula, MNEs will start granting more of it to their employees in
high-tax jurisdictions. However, as this article demonstrates below,
administrative and anti-abuse concerns may require limiting the
payroll factor. For instance, the difficulty of determining
compensation for services rendered by independent contractors may
dictate that the payroll factor be limited to employees or even to
specific types of employees.
V. THE ALLOCATION PHASE IN AN (ALMOST) “IDEAL” REALITY:
FMNES’ INCOME
A. The Financial Sectors and Financial MNEs —
A Story of Integration
Financial intermediaries provide a number of vital functions in
104
the modern economy.
In recent years, as a result of the
liberalization of monetary and financial regulatory regimes around the
world, financial markets witnessed an onslaught of cross -border and
105
cross-sector integration. Financial firms developed new instruments
and services and began to operate in new geographic locations to meet
104

These functions include funding, saving facilities, financial services (transfers
of funds), trading services, insurance underwriting, and hedging contracts.
105
See CHARLES GOODHART, FINANCIAL REGULATION: WHY, HOW AND WHERE
NOW? (1998) (discussing some of the financial regulatory implications of such
integration trends).’’ Traditionally, the financial sector has comprised three legally
distinct sub-sectors: banking, securities trading, and insurance. See JONATHAN R.
MACEY, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 511 (3d ed. 2001). Most banks and their
foreign branches do not limit their activities to any specific type of financial activity.
IFA, supra note 11, at 83.

BENSHALOM.FORMATTED.FINALEDIT5.DOC

11/18/2008 4:25 PM

204

[Vol. 28:165

Virginia Tax Review
106

the changing demands of their clients. The integration of financial
markets served as a platform for the rise of new competitive business
structures of FMNEs, which are essentially MNEs that carry out most
of their business activities within the financial markets. FMNEs utilize
their multi-sector and multi-jurisdictional spectrum to better employ
107
an economy of both scope and scale.
In their operation, FMNEs manifest many of the global market’s
advantages. However, as the recent financial crises suggest, they also
exemplify sovereigns’ difficulties in imposing effective economic and
108
fiscal regulation. FMNEs are uniquely positioned to avoid income
109
taxes by shifting their income to low-tax jurisdictions.
Tax
authorities experience difficulties in penetrating FMNEs’ business
structures, because of their extensive interrelatedness and because
they involve deployments of services and capital assets rather than of
110
tangible goods. Each of the branches and entities of such financial
Goliaths may, under different capacities, offer all of the FMNEs’ end
111
services out of its general pool of human and capital assets. This
106

John Neighbour, The Taxation of Global Trading of Financial Instruments, 16
TAX NOTES INT’L 1269, 1269 (Apr. 20, 1998).
107
In what is an informational market, FMNEs are able to create specialized and
centralized services, to develop finer human capital expertise and reduce operational
costs; to obtain, analyze, and use information more efficiently; and most importantly,
to endure a higher risk exposure because of their portfolio and activity diversification
and reliance on less risky affiliate transactions. American Bankers Association, supra
note 81; Charles T. Plambeck, Transfer Pricing Analysis of Global Trading Operations
and Procedural Alternatives, 74 TAXES 1129, 1132, 1135 (1996); Charles T. Plambeck,
The Taxation Implications of Global Trading, 44 BULL. INT’L FISCAL
DOCUMENTATION 527, 529 (1990) (mentioning competitive advantages of conducting
a global-centralized dealing operation).
108
The international network of FMNEs is thus a source of concern with regard
to many issues (e.g., financial stability of global markets and criminal-fund money
laundering).
109
See IFA, supra note 11, at 81 (mentioning that some of the OECD guidelines
on banks include factors such as the location of where the terms were negotiated,
where the decision of granting the loan was made, where the contract was agreed
upon, and where the loan is administered); Ben Seesse, The Bermuda Reinsurance
“Loophole”: A Case Study of Tax Shelters and Tax Havens in the Globalizing
Economy, 32 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 541 (2001) (demonstrating the unique
position of FMNEs that allows them to pursue tax avoidance plans).
110
MATTIAS LEVIN & PEER RITTER, TAXATION OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION
IN INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES, in TAXATION OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION: THEORY
AND PRACTICE FOR EMERGING ECONOMIES 197, 228 (Patrick Honohan, ed. 2003);
IFA, supra note 11, at 71–72, 87.
111
OECD, supra note 77, at 28 (stressing that this is indeed the case with global
trading of financial instruments).
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process is very difficult to reconcile with transfer-pricing’s traditional
paradigm, which assumes a distinctive structural production chain in
which activities with an identified home location add value to the
112
product. This gap between the “traditional” paradigm and how
113
FMNEs actually operate puts tax authorities at a disadvantage. The
revenue implications of these concerns may be horrendous, given the
ever-growing volume of mobile sophisticated capital assets that
114
FMNEs channel in their activities.
The profound functional
integration of FMNEs fuses the risks and interests of their branches
115
and entities. Hence, the main difficulty tax authorities face is how to
price and restructure uniquely tailored related transactions within
FMNEs, and whether to respect the face value of those transactions’
116
contractual risk allocations.
B. Delineating the Scope of the Article’s Proposal in an “Ideal” Reality
Financial institutions offer an “ideal” setting for experimenting
with innovative tax allocation techniques for financial income because
their business activities involve primarily two types of assets: human
117
capital and financial assets. FMNEs utilize almost all of their human
capital assets to service financial assets. Hence, basically all of
FMNEs’ income could be categorized as financial income. FMNEs are
therefore the plain vanilla case for the study’s inquiry of seeking a
112

Andrew M. Snyder, Taxation of Global Trading Operations: Use of Advance
Pricing Agreements and Profit-Split Methodology, 48 TAX LAW 1057, 1059 (1995).
113
See Susan C. Borkowski, Global Trading of Financial Instruments and
Transfer Pricing: A Brief History and Exploratory Study, 29 INT’L TAX J. 22, 36 (2003)
(showing that, due to the difficulty of auditing financial institutions there is an “audit
gap” with regard to the ability of tax authorities to effectively monitor their
operations).
114
This concern may be amplified given that FMNEs are typically among the
most affluent and well-advised taxpayers.
115
Randall, supra note 32, at 885 (suggesting that this makes the risk component
difficult to assign to any specific location).
116
IFA, supra note 11, at 87; Sheppard, supra note 80, at 434 (pointing out that
unrelated party finance involves more risk — especially credit risk — than related
transactions, and that this divergence of risks affects the price of transactions, making
it difficult to compare them to unrelated transactions).
117
These assets are packaged in many different legal forms. Human capital may
be provided as services, production intangibles (e.g., risk assessment software), or
marketing consumer-based intangibles (e.g., goodwill). Financial assets may have
different physical forms (e.g., cash, notes, e-money) or legal definitions (e.g., stock,
bonds, swaps, futures, or options — all of them could be replicated by other
instruments). See supra note 15.
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better alternative for sourcing MNEs’ financial income.
Additionally, as mentioned above, the transactional fact-based
arm’s-length paradigm simply falls apart in the case of integrated
FMNEs. This article’s proposal (the Proposal) does not aim to provide
a flawless sourcing regime. Taking existing alternatives as its reference
point, it aims to provide a more equitable, transparent, administrable,
and coherent sourcing solution for FMNEs than the one currently in
place. Boldly put, given the difficulties of existing alternatives, it is
easy for the Proposal to offer improvements.
The analysis in this part assumes the following. First, it is possible
to insulate and distinguish FMNEs from other MNEs. Second,
FMNEs operate exclusively through branches and fully owned
subsidiaries. Third, the article assumes the existence of a
comprehensive multilateral agreement that implements the Proposal.
This “ideal” reality allows the article to crystallize the Proposal’s
principal analytical foundations. However, it is important to stress that
this “ideal” reality is not a utopian coast beyond reach in the case of
FMNEs. In most Western countries, FMNEs are indeed insulated.
They are prevented from operating in other market sectors by the
118
national financial regulatory regimes.
Firms operating in the
financial sector are subject to distinct ownership rules that prevent
them from being substantially engaged in businesses of other sectors.
This outcome of prudential financial regulation suggests that although
there are always hard cases on the margins, the vast majority of
FMNEs could be easily distinguished from other MNEs.
To operate flexibly while complying with financial regulations,
which deal with capital adequacy requirements, FMNEs (especially
119
banks) operate mainly through branches.
To protect sensitive
information and valuable intangibles, many FMNEs own all or almost
all of their subsidiaries’ stock.
Some type of multilateral agreement in the case of FMNEs is also
not impossible. Although a unanimous approval by all countries of a
comprehensive income allocation rule does indeed seem unlikely, it is
not necessary in the case of FMNEs. To cover most of FMNEs’
activities, only a critical mass of countries where FMNEs operate need
to approve the Proposal. Most FMNEs’ activities take place in
jurisdictions that have large-scale financial markets operating within

118

IFA, supra note 11, at 77, 99.
Branches may go into partnerships with other financial institutions.
Determining the income allocation of partners is a separate (and extremely
complicated) task, which this article does not address.
119
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them and, therefore, it is only necessary to reach an agreement among
those jurisdictions. What comprises this critical mass may vary
according to the economic activity performed by the FMNEs. For
example, establishing a viable sourcing arrangement in the case of
securities dealing probably requires only an agreement among United
States, United Kingdom, and Japanese tax authorities. In the case of
banking, the addition of Germany and France and other Western
European countries may also be required. Given the relatively small
120
number of countries involved, and their similarity of interests,
attaining this objective is admittedly difficult but not impossible.
C. The Proposal
In light of the above analysis, it appears that the best factors in an
apportionment formula sourcing FMNEs’ earnings would be the
indicators of tangible property and payroll. The common virtue of
both indicators is their relative immobility and ease of assessment.
The task of the unitary formula is, therefore, to provide a good proxy
for locating the income FMNEs generate. Since FMNEs derive most
of their income from intangible and financial assets, the benchmark
121
through which this income should be sourced is payroll. The main
underlying normative theme behind this argument is that mobile
financial assets are economically owned jointly by all of FMNEs
subsidiaries and branches. Since FMNEs’ financial assets cannot
themselves be geographically located, tax authorities can only allocate
FMNE income by tracing the geographic location of the human
capital that elicited it. Additionally, while the Proposal relates only to
the sourcing of net taxable income, it could easily be extended to
include the sourcing of net taxable capital gains and losses arising
from the sale of capital assets.
The Proposal involves the following steps. First, one has to
determine FMNEs’ net taxable income. Due to different tax bases and
tax accounting rules, tax authorities’ ability to reach one agreed-upon
figure of net taxable income is doubtful. This, however, is not a
problem in the “ideal” reality addressed by this part, which assumes a
comprehensive multilateral agreement. It is nevertheless important to
120

All are developed countries and depend, at least to some degree, on corporate
income taxes to sustain long term welfare obligations. Part V.B will address this issue
in greater detail.
121
In this respect, the Proposal aligns with the insight of the 2006 OECD report
that the main value of FMNEs is generated through their experienced workforce. See
OECD, supra note 79.
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note that this net taxable income figure should include only the profits
and losses from business activities (including deductions for employee
compensation). As discussed below, it should not include tax
expenditures. Furthermore, depreciation expenses of tangible
property should be deducted from FMNEs’ general pool of income
only if all nations employ uniform depreciation rates. I assume that
nations do not employ such uniform rates. Therefore, tax depreciation
expenses should not be deducted from the general pool of FMNEs’
income but from the income allocated to every state.
Second, tax authorities should determine FMNEs’ (aggregated)
economic, tangible asset, and intangible asset values. The economic
value would be determined according to the stock price of FMNEs.
The aggregated value of FMNEs’ tangible assets (Tangibles’ Value)
122
would be determined by their financial accounting “book” value.
The aggregated value of FMNEs’ financial, intangible, and human
capital assets is the difference between the economic value and the
123
Tangibles’ Value (Residual Value). It would be calculated by
subtracting FMNEs’ Tangibles’ Values from their economic values.
The feasibility of this valuation process depends upon the percentage
of FMNEs registered as public companies (which most major FMNEs
are). Information about FMNEs’ assets could also be obtained from
financial regulators, which, especially in the case of banks, closely
monitor FMNEs’ holdings.
However, with regard to payroll, tax authorities may find that
determining the compensation for independent contractors is
administratively difficult. For example, an FMNE hires a janitor, a
guard, a secretary, and a driver through independent contractors.
Besides their labor expenses, independent contractors have
depreciation of tangible property as well as operational and
managerial expenses, for which they require compensation from the
FMNE. More importantly, contractors may assume the liabilities for
risks associated with the services they provide and may require the
FMNE to further compensate them for that. Some of these indirect

122

This would comprise purchase value minus depreciated amounts as
determined by GAAP (and not by tax depreciation).
123
This method is similar to the one of Treas. Reg. § 1.861–9T(h) (2006).
Corporations are subject to an interest deduction allocation under Code section
864(e) that requires them to allocate their income deductions according to an asset
formula. This regulation allows corporations to elect their deductions using the FMV
of their assets rather than by their tax base. Corporations wishing to elect this method
must come up with a way to determine the value of their intangibles. They do so by
using this notion of residual value.
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employees may work for the same independent contractor at a
number of locations and receive different salaries for each of these
part-time jobs. In this scenario, the FMNE and tax authorities would
find it difficult to insulate the compensation for the labor factor of
independent contractors.
A number of approaches to this problem may be taken. The
formulary payroll factor could include independent contractor
compensation. This solution requires taxpayers and tax authorities to
bear compliance and administrative costs associated with insulating
compensation for labor factor paid to independent contractors.
Alternatively, the payroll calculation could exclude independent
contractors altogether. This would allow FMNEs to manipulate the
payroll factor by sourcing out as many functions as they can (e.g.,
support staff) to outside contractors in high-tax jurisdictions.
Under the framework developed in Part IV.B, this article suggests
a payroll definition that is reasonably accurate and easy to administer
and that would limit FMNE planning opportunities. One possible
approach is that the payroll factor should only include compensation
for professional employees. This would include employees engaged in
front and back office activities (e.g., creating and monitoring loans,
marketing, and dealing). Admittedly, this requires taxpayers and tax
authorities to agree upon a classification of professional employees.
However, because the financial sector is heavily regulated, this effort
is manageable, and has been addressed by the OECD in its proposed
124
branch allocation rules. The payroll factor should exclude the
support staff of FMNEs (e.g., secretaries and administrative
assistants), even though the work of skilled support staff is a
meaningful contribution to FMNE profitability. The article justifies
the exclusion of supporting staff by pointing to FMNEs’ ability to
contract out their functions to avoid taxes.
This arrangement adheres to the objectives set by the article. The
reliance on employees reduces the difficulty of extracting the
compensation for labor from services rendered by independent
contractors. The work of professional employees could be perceived
as providing the core of FMNEs income generating activities — thus,
it provides a good indicator to relative volumes of their activities in
different jurisdictions. For business reasons, FMNEs are much less

124

OECD, supra note 77, at 76–77, 127–34 (providing a comprehensive
description of the different professional positions and functions undertaken by
FMNEs engaged in banking and securities trading).
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125

likely to outsource jobs performed by professional employees.
Additionally, their compensation would be easy to observe.
This article may err in two important respects. Tax authorities can
significantly reduce the compliance burden of determining
compensation for labor paid indirectly by FMNEs to independent
126
contractors by making some simplifying assumptions. Additionally,
FMNEs may be able to source out considerably more functions in
high-tax jurisdictions than the article assumes they can. This would
allow them to manipulate the payroll factor. If either of these
possibilities is true, tax authorities may find it better to calculate the
payroll factor according to the compensation for labor paid to all
employees and independent contractors. Successfully incorporating
this broad notion of employees depends on the nature of the
simplifying assumptions that this type of system would make.
Leases of tangible property pose a problem similar to the one of
independent contractors. To reduce the income allocated to high-tax
jurisdictions, FMNEs may lease instead of own tangibles there. Since
both the financing and leasing expenses are deductible from FMNEs’
general pool of income, leasing may be a profitable strategy for
reducing taxes. To deal with this problem, FMNEs should report the
economic value of their tangible-property leases as part of their
Tangibles’ Value. For example, assume an FMNE leases a big
complex in London for a period of 20 years. The lease payments, just
like the mortgage it would have paid if it purchased the complex, are
deductible from its general pool of income. Accordingly, the FMNE
would have to add the FMV of the lease — meaning how much a third
party would pay right now for the right to lease the building for 20
127
years. This figure should be added to the Tangibles’ Value of the
FMNE.
Third, FMNEs’ net taxable income should be bifurcated
according to the ratio of its Tangibles’ Value and Residual Value.
Each of the portions would be deemed to reflect the financial income

125

Outsourcing these professionals entails bigger business risks (having sensitive
information leaked out and high staff turnover), and would prohibit FMNEs from
supplying these highly-compensated (and highly-taxed) employees with certain
benefits, which are typically tax-subsidized.
126
Such simplifying assumptions may categorize all payments made to
independent contractors as compensation for labor. To avoid inflating the payroll
factor, FMNEs should discount a fixed (and arbitrary) percentage of these payments
from the payroll factor.
127
Tax authorities can easily determine the FMV of the lease by determining the
net present value of the lease payments.
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generated from each type of asset. One would expect that for most
FMNEs the income attributed to intangible assets would be
considerably greater. This is appropriate because, as explained earlier,
the lion’s share of FMNEs’ value is generated by their ability to
provide financial services and to manage financial assets — an ability
that is largely invested in their workforces and their adroitness. It is
the qualifications of this workforce that allow FMNEs to elicit profits
by efficiently internalizing the different risks associated with financial
activities. Nevertheless, it is important to have the Tangibles’ Value
component because the depreciation of tangible assets should be
deducted from the income allocated to each country and not from
FMNEs’ net taxable income. Additionally, as discussed in detail in the
subsequent part, the Tangibles’ Value is crucial for extending the
Proposal to allow formulary allocation of MNEs’ financial income.
Fourth, tax authorities would employ two allocation formulas to
determine the income attributable to each jurisdiction. The portion of
income attributed to Tangibles’ Value would be allocated to each
jurisdiction according to the relative Tangibles’ Value a given FMNE
has in that jurisdiction. By the same token, the portion of income
attributed to the Residual Value would be allocated to each
jurisdiction according to the relative percentage of the overall payroll
expenses paid by a given FMNE in it.
Finally, once FMNEs’ income is allocated among jurisdictions,
every jurisdiction may allow FMNEs to deduct expenses that were not
included in the computation of their net taxable incomes. This would
include expenses that are contingent on the specific location:
depreciation of tangible assets and tax expenditures.
The following example illustrates how the Proposal works (all
figures in this example are in millions of United States dollars). CBH
is a profitable FMNE traded on the London Stock Exchange. In a
given fiscal year, CBH had a net taxable income of $1000, which it had
to allocate among its headquarters, located in country A, and foreign
branches located in countries B and C. CBH’s stock was sold under
the aggregated market value of $10,000. Its Tangibles’ (book) Value
was $1000 and its Residual Value $9000 (which is the difference
between CBH’s market value and its Tangibles’ Value). The
Tangibles’-Residual Values ratio in that given year was 1:9.
Accordingly, 10% of CBH’s net taxable income ($100) would be
sourced according to the relative percentage of Tangibles’ Value in
each jurisdiction, and 90% ($900) would be sourced according to the
relative payroll paid in each jurisdiction. In the present example, a
total of $6300 respresented annual payroll payments of CBH, paid in
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each of those jurisdictions according to the following distribution:
$4200 at CBH headquarters in country A, $1400 at the branch in
country B, and $700 at the branch in country C. The numerical
example provided in figure #3 can help elucidate this mechanism.
FIGURE 3. CBH’S INCOME ALLOCATION UNDER THE PROPOSAL
Country C

CBH's Headq's

CBH’s Aggregated Figures
Total Income (TI): $1000
Market Value (MV): $10,000
Tangibles’ Value (TV): $1000
Residual Value (RV): $9000
Total Payroll (TP): $6300
Total Tangibles’ Income (TTI): $100
7. Total Residual Income (TRI): $900

Tangibles’
Value (HTV):
$500;
Payroll (HP):
$4200.

Income Allocation
Headquarters’ Income
1. Tangibles’ Income: $50
2. Residual Income: $600

Branch C
Tangibles’
Value (CTV):
$300;
Payroll (CP):
$700.

Country A

Branch B
Tangibles'’
Value (BTV):
$200;
Payroll (BP):
$1400.

Country B

CBH
Headquarters
Branch B
Branch C

Tangibles’ Income
100 = TTI = 1*(1000/10,000) =
TI*(TV/MV)
50 = (500/1000)*0.1 = (HTV/TV)*TTI
20 = (200/1000)*0.1 = (BTV/TV)*TTI
30 = (300/1000)*0.1 = (CTV/TV)*TTI

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Branch B’s Income
3. Tangibles' income: $20
4. Residual income: $200
Branch C’s Income
5. Tangibles’ Income: $30
6. Residual Income: $100

Residual Income
0.9b = TRI = 1*(9000/10,000) = TI*(RV/MV)
600 = (4200/6300)*0.9 = (HP/TP)*TRI
200 = (1400/6300)*0.9 = (BP/TP)*TRI
100 = (700/6300)*0.9 = (CP/TP)*TRI

The Proposal makes a clear distinction between the fiscal and
legal ownerships of financial assets. For tax purposes, an FMNE
subsidiary could be allocated more or fewer financial assets than it is
perceived to legally own according to other legal doctrines. This tax
determination should not affect other legal regimes (e.g., financial
regulations, corporate insolvency), in which the geographic allocation
of financial assets within FMNEs may bear significance.
The unitary system is a territorial system that taxes FMNEs’
income once at the source level. Under the Proposal, no intra-FMNE
flows of capital resources are subject to any residence tax cost or to
withholding taxes. Taxes on FMNEs’ dividend distributions to their
shareholders may be subject to tax according to each nation’s tax
policy.
The Proposal, like any unitary system, raises a number of
128
problems, some of which result from this article’s attempt to
128
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introduce a unitary setting in an insufficiently integrated political
setting. First, and most notably, the Proposal’s emphasis on
compensation for labor as a sourcing benchmark neglects the problem
of different wage structures in various countries. Thus, the Proposal
skews the revenue flow toward the richer countries because of their
higher wage scales. This arrangement may seem unfair, and thus
significantly reduces the political plausibility of the Proposal. To
prevent this, all payroll formulary components would have to include
129
controls for cost of living. Similarly, the assets formula would need
controls for the consumption value of money in various jurisdictions.
The degree to which these considerations should be taken into
account is a complicated topic with profound distributive implications.
This issue transcends the scope of this article and is deferred to future
papers.
The Proposal’s emphasis on payroll requires special treatment for
employees working in a number of jurisdictions. This problem is
magnified in the case of highly mobile senior managers, whose salaries
may significantly skew the sourcing of FMNEs’ income. An extreme
example of why this may be problematic is an FMNE which in a given
(profitable) fiscal year paid 10% of its payroll to its top twenty
executives. In that same year, most of these executives spent more
time than usual in low-tax jurisdictions. A potential solution to these
extreme cases of abuse would be to avoid attributing management
salaries to the payroll factor of any specific location, when the total
percentage of their salary exceeds a certain relative percentage of the
total payroll. This arrangement treats the highly compensated human
capital of these managers as owned solely on the level of the FMNEs,
thus preventing the relocation of managers from influencing FMNEs’
corporate tax liability.
Additionally, while this article firmly maintains that payroll is the
most reliable proxy for allocating FMNE income, adopting it poses
significant political problems. By tying the sourcing of FMNEs to the
payroll as a proxy for their rents from intangibles, the Proposal
imposes an implicit tax on labor. Some of the distorting mechanisms
of this implicit tax would be reduced by the uniform application of the
Proposal and by the inability of FMNEs to substitute insider human
capital expertise. FMNEs would not be able to escape these costs
Issues in Implementing Formula Apportionment at the International Level, 13 TAX
NOTES INT’L 2113, 2141 (Dec. 23, 1996).
129
Kathleen Matthews, U.S. and Canadian Officials Discuss APAs in the Global
Trading Context; Advance Pricing Agreements, 8 TAX NOTES INT’L 1362, 1363 (May
23, 1994).
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given their dependency upon skilled workforces operating from hightax countries. Once most of the key players are subject to similar
costs, none is placed in a competitive disadvantage in comparison to
130
the others. Like many other costs, the implicit tax costs on labor
would become part of the costs attached to conducting business in the
financial sector. Uniform application of the payroll factor would
therefore impose a tax on the financial sector as a whole, but would
not create huge variations within that sector. Countries can control
what they may see as the negative impact of this implicit labor tax by
131
adjusting the corporate income tax rate they impose on FMNEs.
Nevertheless, due to the high level of unemployment in some high-tax
Western countries, the Proposal’s emphasis on payroll as a dominant
formulary factor is bound to be extremely controversial. While this
concern does not defeat the article’s argument, it suggests that
promoting the Proposal would be an uphill battle.
Even if the income tax base of FMNEs were to be harmonized via
a multilateral agreement, a number of key issues would still have to be
left to the discretion of each country. This is true especially with
respect to tax expenditures (e.g., charitable donations). Leaving these
issues outside the unitary realm is crucial. Otherwise, countries will
have incentives to inflate the tax expenditure deductions knowing that
they are deducted from FMNEs’ aggregated net taxable incomes and
not directly from their own revenues. Because only a murky line
distinguishes tax expenditures from tax base attributes, policymakers
may find it analytically difficult to delineate a guiding principle for
what should be left to each country’s discretion.
Determining the contours of tax expenditures is particularly
complex in those cases where tax expenditures are inherently related
to FMNE business conduct, e.g., R&D tax subsidies and accelerated
depreciation. While there is no easy-line-drawing solution, it is
important to note that the current system is not free from these
dilemmas. To the contrary, tax authorities have a difficult time
confronting the ability of MNEs to incur tax expenditures in high-tax
jurisdictions while reporting income in low-tax jurisdictions. This gave
rise to cumbersome and costly mechanisms intended to limit the
132
source deductibility of these expenditures.
130

The key issue here is the CAR requirements, which are imposed with some
uniformity across the different financial sectors in Western countries.
131
Under the Proposal, countries would be free to set any corporate tax rate on
FMNEs — this would include the right to subject them to lower corporate tax rate
with regard to other corporations.
132
See Treas. Reg. § 1.861-17 (1995).
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Although the article refrains from providing a comprehensive
answer to this issue, its Proposal is not inferior to the current tax
arrangement. The article’s principled position is, however, that the
concept of tax expenditures should be construed broadly. This is
essential to prevent unfair tax base competition in which sovereigns
give accelerated deductions, knowing that they would be deducted
from FMNEs’ net taxable income and not from the income attributed
directly to them.
Finally, if strictly applied, cases may arise in which the Proposal’s
unitary income allocation system may result in compliance and
administrative costs that would render its application inefficient.
Accordingly, the Proposal should have a de minimis rule that exempts
small FMNEs and/or FMNEs with only minor foreign operations.
While the Proposal should by no means be subject to FMNE election,
it should be considered a mandatory default. FMNEs with special
business structures would have the opportunity to enter into
agreements with tax authorities to select the proper allocation
techniques according to which their income should be allocated. This
arrangement resembles the current Advanced Pricing Agreement
133
(APA) process, with the exception that it puts tax authorities in a
superior bargaining position when entering into such agreements.
D. An Assessment of the Proposal
There are three benchmarks according to which the Proposal
should be assessed. The first refers to the likelihood that its
implementation would reduce FMNEs’ ability to use their internal
financial flows to avoid taxes. The second refers to whether the
133

In an APA, taxpayers elect to negotiate in advance the type of transfer-pricing
method to which they will be subjected. The APA alternative is primarily election by
taxpayers, which, like FMNEs, have integrated cross-border operations, are exposed
to uncommon risks or employ unique pricing techniques. Those taxpayers often use
the APA method to curtail compliance costs associated with having tax authorities
continuously scrutinize and challenge their pricing methods. See Diane M. Ring, On
the Frontier of Procedural Innovation: Advanced Pricing Agreements and the Struggle
to Allocate Income for Cross Border Taxation, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 143 (2000). It
would likely prove difficult to advocate the use of APAs as a broad solution to the
problem of FMNEs because of their voluntariness and particularity. In light of the tax
avoidance potential of FMNEs and their prominent role in the global economy, the
difficulty of auditing them should not be sporadically resolved on an ad-hoc basis.
Kelvin K. Leung, Note, Taxing Global Trading: An Appropriate Testing Ground for
Formula Apportionment?, 1 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 201, 204–05, 228–30 (1992); see
generally Richard McAlonan et al., Annual Report Provides Transparency Into APA
Process, 115 TAX NOTES 1283 (June 25, 2007).
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Proposal reduces the IITR’s compliance costs, administrative costs,
and inefficiencies. The third is whether the sourcing approximation of
the unitary system achieves an overall intuitive sourcing result.
As mentioned in Part II.C, there are three main avenues of abuse
— deferral, excessive repatriation of foreign tax credits, and income
shifting through related party transactions — all of which would be
eliminated under the Proposal. As a territorial system in which all
income is taxed only once, at source, the Proposal has no resident
taxation and derivatively no tax credit manipulation or problems of
deferral. The unitary rules disregard intra-FMNE transactions and
thus eliminate FMNEs’ ability to engage in income shifting.
Opponents of the Proposal may nevertheless argue that the
tradeoff is not that simple. At least in the case of deferral and credit
manipulation, the remedy offered by the Proposal throws the baby out
with the bathwater because it comes at the price of waiving FMNEs’
residence taxation. This could arguably incentivize FMNEs to shift
their activities to low-tax jurisdictions.
The answer to this objection is multilayered. As the author wrote
134
in a different paper, to date, residence taxes result in less revenue
than a (more territorial) dividend exemption tax system with
equivalent tax rate would raise. This is because countries employing
residence taxation do not impose residency taxes on foreign
subsidiaries; rather they levy their taxes only upon repatriation of
those subsidiaries’ earnings. In the case of the United States, the use
of hybrid entities permitted by the “check the box” regulations allows
many MNEs to avoid almost all residency taxes. To date, a growing
number of countries have been exploring the possibility of altering tax
legislation to establish more territorial tax systems. Given this, the
possibility that in the foreseeable future policymakers will introduce a
more robust residency taxation to deal with the problems of excessive
credit repatriation or with deferral seems unlikely in my opinion.
Hence, while strong normative arguments in favor of residency
135
taxation exist, from a practical perspective, there seems little reason
to hold fast to residency taxation for FMNEs.
From a normative perspective, this article maintains that tax
corporate residency is an analytically flawed concept. The impersonal
nature of corporations allows them to manipulate their tax residency.
Furthermore, corporate tax residency status bears only negligible

134

See Benshalom, supra note 82, at 633–34.
See, e.g., Robert J. Peroni, A Hitchhiker’s Guide to Reform of the Foreign Tax
Credit Limitation, 56 SMU L. REV. 391 (2003); Peroni et al., supra note 89.
135
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As best
operational or (pre-tax) economic consequences.
manifested through the inversion phenomena discussed briefly in Part
III.B.1, supra, United States MNEs exercised their entrepreneurial
rights to expatriate to offshore low-tax jurisdictions simply by
reincorporating there. This allowed the MNEs that were formerly tax
residents of the United States to avoid completely United States
residence taxation while continuing to relish (almost) exactly the same
United States market and infrastructure benefits as before they
changed residency classification. The following table summarizes a
comparative evaluation of various parameters between the Proposal
and the current regime.
TABLE 2. A COMPARED ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSAL
AND CURRENT FMNE TAX REGIME
Current
Article’s Proposal
1. Deferral
Very high
N.A.
2. Excessive tax credit
Very high
N.A.
repatriation
3. Income shifting by
Very high
Very low
related transactions
*On a scale from “very high” to “very low,” the lower ratings in the table are the
preferential ones.

The second criterion according to which the Proposal should be
evaluated is whether it reduces compliance costs and the economic
deadweight of the corporate income tax. As the author has written
137
extensively elsewhere, unitary systems are almost certain to perform
better on both accounts. First, the shift to a formulary system reduces
compliance associated with FMNEs’ need to contractually delineate
transactions according to transfer-pricing consideration with the
arm’s-length standard. By the same token, the shift to a unitary system
reduces tax authorities’ administrative costs. As a result, the audit
process is bound to become less arbitrary because the audit
consequences of FMNEs would depend on where productive assets
138
are located and not upon the outcomes of the audit lotteries. Put
differently, the unitary system is a legitimate allocation tool even
though it does not aim to measure and allocate income with perfect
precision. This legitimacy is anchored in the failure of the arm’s-length
alternative to offer any more precise allocation results.
136

See Graetz, supra note 8, at 320.
Benshalom, supra note 82, at 689–94.
138
The audit lottery refers to the chance that a specific taxpayer will be audited
in any given fiscal year.
137
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The shift to a unitary system also reduces the economic
deadweight of the income tax in one significant way. By disregarding
intra-group financial flows and services, the Proposal removes all tax
obstacles on these transactions. It allows management greater
resiliency in employing resources without giving heed to tax
consequences. Critics of the shift to a unitary system may nevertheless
argue that this gain in efficiency comes at the great expense of
FMNEs placing more facilities and workforces according to tax
considerations. The factual answer to whether the shift to a unitary
system results in an efficiency net gain or loss is speculative, factual,
and difficult to determine. The article contends, however, that there is
a normative difference between the post-investment tax distortions it
seeks to alleviate and the pre-investment tax distortions its critics may
claim the Proposal enhances.
Unlike the ethos of capital-exporting neutrality, the article does
not seek to prevent FMNEs from taking corporate tax considerations
into account when deciding where to place workforce and production
facilities. Corporate taxes are yet another type of state-imposed costs
that should be assessed by entrepreneurs in light of their projected
returns. Through the corporate taxes, sovereigns price corporations’
use of their infrastructures. Imposing a worldwide corporate tax to
attain investment neutrality is equivalent to imposing worldwide labor
market regulations to attain such neutrality. Hence, MNEs should
legitimately give heed to all tax considerations prior to investing in a
given location.
The article does however seek to reduce post-investment tax
distortions. This requires that once an investment has been made —
meaning that tangible properties have been purchased and a
workforce has been created — the tax price would be fixed to prevent
FMNEs from structuring operations solely to manipulate their tax
liabilities. The shift to a unitary system allows a substantial efficiency
gain because FMNEs would not be able to change the ratio between
earned income and tax liability by channeling mobile assets and
activities through low-tax jurisdictions. They will therefore have the
incentive to increase their pre-tax earnings as much as possible.
Moreover, under a unitary system, there are no tax obstacles for doing
so: FMNEs could freely arrange their financial assets and corporate
structure without incurring tax liability upon intra-group transactions
such as earnings repatriation. This would allow them to invest their
assets in those places with the highest pre-tax return. Once FMNEs
decide to locate some of their workforce and tangible property in a
specific jurisdiction, they become indifferent to the tax rates in
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jurisdictions where their financial assets are located. Thus, once the
investments are made, there are no tax obstacles preventing the
efficient investment of FMNE financial resources.
The third criterion is whether allocating FMNEs’ net taxable
income through a (primarily) payroll-based appropriation formula is
intuitively correct. In some cases, the Proposal’s allocation seems
unintuitive. For example, when a new foreign branch or subsidiary is
established, it often takes some time for it to generate profitability. In
such instances, the averaging function of the Proposal’s allocation
formula may seem inadequate. If the FMNE has a positive net taxable
income, some of it would be allocated to the new branch or subsidiary.
On the other side of the continuum, the Proposal’s allocation seems to
produce appropriate sourcing results in cases of global dealing, where
different branches of a specific FMNE actively trade financial
instruments pooled into a single book. The answer to whether the
balance struck by the Proposal is appealing depends by and large on
what one thinks of the “abusiveness” of income shifting and the use of
the arm’s-length benchmark. This article’s analysis established that
FMNE income is generated by financial assets and human capital, that
payroll is a good indicator for human capital, and that FMNEs have
almost full flexibility in structuring their intra-group financial flows
and holdings. If one accepts these conclusions, then the averaging
result of the Proposal’s formula should seem appropriate.
By way of conclusion, FMNEs are unique in the sense that they
are operating in an integrated market and deal primarily with mobile
intangible assets. FMNE related transactions often have no market
comparables and therefore could not be coherently attributed to any
specific jurisdiction. The Proposal’s unitary setting is by no means a
panacea. However, to evaluate its merits one must consider the
alternative it seeks to replace. The article maintains firmly that the
key to this evaluation lies in the accelerating level of integration in
financial markets. If the Proposal is not adopted, the high levels of
cross-border and cross-sector integration would eventually make it
completely impossible for tax authorities to break down affiliated
transactions according to an arm’s-length standard. This inevitably
renders the income tax regime more cumbersome, costly, inefficient,
and inequitable. Additionally, although the Proposal waives sovereign
ability to levy residency tax on FMNEs, it is important to remember
that, to date, residence taxation has not been a net revenue gain
regime but one which, on top of its complexities, levies fewer revenues
than alternative dividend exemption regimes. Bearing this in mind,
the Proposal, if adopted, is likely to outperform the current sourcing
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techniques, in the case of FMNEs, in almost every respect.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This article identifies the core attributes that make financial
income so difficult to tax under existing IITR arm’s-length
conventions: mobility and fungibility. It further points out that in the
context of affiliated financial transactions, this combination is
horrendous because there is no “correct” market financial structure
upon which tax authorities can rely as a benchmark. Related parties
can therefore structure financial transactions in many different,
economically equivalent, forms to attain tax avoidance preferences by
using readily available tax planning expertise. The view that the
special attributes of financial income render irrelevant the existing
legal structures governing the taxation of affiliated financial
transactions is gaining traction among tax policymakers in the United
States and other Western countries. Hence, with regard to financial
income, legislators, tax authorities, and the OECD have become more
willing to deviate from the arm’s-length standard in favor of more
formulary solutions.
This article advances a unitary solution in the context of FMNEs.
It suggests that their income could be adequately sourced through a
formula that relies on the value of their tangible assets and intangible
human capital assets in each jurisdiction. It offers difficult to
manipulate indicators that would help determine the geographic
locations of these assets and explains why the adoption of its solution
is feasible politically and administratively. Moreover, this article
stresses that MNEs’ financial income should be sourced, as a matter of
principle, in accordance with where their tangible assets and labor is
employed and not according to the contractual attributes of the
transaction.
139
In a future paper, I would take this notion a step further and
examine how MNEs’ financial income should be formulary-sourced.
Unlike FMNEs, MNEs have some financial income (gains or losses),
but generate mostly non-financial income. This extension of the
proposal would therefore require a careful definition of what

139

Ilan Benshalom, Taxing the Financial Income of Multinational Enterprises, 28
VA. TAX REV. (forthcoming 2009).

BENSHALOM.FORMATTED.FINALEDIT5.DOC

2008]

Tax Financial Income in a Global Economy

11/18/2008 4:25 PM

221

comprises financial income. Additionally, unlike FMNEs, MNEs
operate from a wide rage of countries and may have a very
complicated ownership structure. Accordingly, the proposal for
formulary sourcing MNEs’ financial income offers a set of ideas about
how it could be successfully implemented even in the absence of
multilateral consensus and even in complex MNE group ownership
structures

